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Abstract 
In this paper, we develop a theory of abstract argumentation systems. An abstract argumentation 
system is a collection of “defeasible proofs”, called arguments, that is partially ordered by a 
relation expressing the difference in conclusive force. The prefix “abstract” indicates that the theory 
is concerned neither with a specification of the underlying language, nor with the development of 
a subtheory that explains the partial order. An unstructured language, without logical connectives 
such as negation, makes arguments not (pairwise) inconsistent, but (groupwise) incompatible. 
Incompatibility and difference in conclusive force cause defeat among arguments. The aim of 
the theory is to find out which arguments eventually emerge undefeated. These arguments are 
considered to be in force. Several results are established. The main result is that arguments 
that are in force are precisely those that are in the limit of a so-called complete argumentation 
sequence. @ 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Various logics have been proposed to reason with symbolically represented forms of 
incomplete or uncertain information. One approach is influenced by (informal) argu- 
mentation theory. The idea is that argumentation theory contains the right concepts and 
ideas to reason with incomplete or uncertain information. These insights are formalized, 
and the formalism thus obtained is then used to represent and manipulate rule-based 
forms of incomplete or uncertain information on the computer. In a nutshell, this is the 
motivating thought behind theories of formal argument. 





The American philosopher Pollock developed an argumentation system called 
OSCAR [ 3 l-33,35,36] ( 1985-1997). OSCAR has the possibility to reason 
with so-called suppositional arguments. A suppositional argument is a defeasible 
argument with conclusion q, in which a premise p is discarded to infer the 
implication p 3 q. (Cf. [ 3,401.) 
In 1986, the philosopher Donald Nute wrote a report, entitled “A non-monotonic 
logic based on conditional logic” [ 291. In that report, Nute defines a simple and 
elegant system of defeasible reasoning, called LDRl, that he shows is readily 
implementable on the computer. * Two years later, in 1988, Nute [ 301 presented 
a revised and extended version of LDRl, called LDR. In LDR, adjudication 
among competing arguments is done via top-rules: one argument defeats another 
if and only if the antecedent of the top-rule of the first argument is strictly more 
specific than the antecedent of the top-rule of the second argument. 
In 1987, Loui [ 211 presented a system of defeat among arguments, in which 
defeat is defined recursively in terms of preference, interference, specificity, 
directness, d-shortness, and evidence. Later, in 1992, Loui presented, together 
with Simari [ 451, a mathematical treatment of defeasible reasoning in which a 
new defeasible consequence operator t_ is introduced. (Cf. [55], for a detailed 
analysis of both articles.) In 1991-1993, Loui et al. [24] developed NATHAN, 
a C implementation of rules for computing defeat among arguments. NATHAN 
is based on LMNOP ( 1993), a LISP-prototype developed by Costello, Loui and 
Merrill [ 24,451. 
In 1988, Horty and Thomason [ 161 presented a theory of mixed inheritance in 
nonmonotonic proof nets. Inheritance theory resembles symbolic argumentation, 
with an important difference that antecedents of rules consist of exactly one 
formula, and arguments are called “paths”. Because paths are “one-dimensional” 
lines of reasoning, inheritance theory is not as involved as a theory in which 
arguments are trees. Perhaps in consequence thereof, it is right on a number of 
crucial aspects, especially when it comes to the resolution of complicated defeat 
and interference relations between paths. 
’ First, the program was called PROWIS (for programming with subjunctives), and was implemented in 
micro-PROLOG 3.1. Later ( 1988), the implementation was changed and renamed into d-PROLOG (for 
defeasible PROLOG). 
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(5) In 1988, Konolige [ 171 proposed a solution to the Yale Shooting Problem (YSP) . 
Unlike most of the proposals, his treatment was not meant to promote an already 
existing formalism. Instead, it worked the other way around. By means of a 
particular problem-the YSP-Konolige discussed the issue of what should be 
involved when one reasons about events. The resulting discussion is extremely 
clear, and touches upon many important issues of defeasible argumentation in 
an almost casual manner. Meanwhile, the formalism more or less automatically 
emerges out of the discussion. Konolige’s formalism ARGH ( ARGumentation 
with Hypotheses) is based on McCarthy’s situation calculus, where properties 
are attached to situations. 
(6) Lin and Shoham [20] (1988, 1993) developed an argument system that cap- 
tures a number of well-known nonmonotonic logics. Among others, the authors 
mention: Reiter’s default logic, McDermott and Doyle’s nonmonotonic logic I, 
Moore’s autoepistemic logic, negation by failure, McCarthy’s circumscription, 
Lifschitz’ pointwise circumscription, various forms of inheritance, and Shoham’s 
theory of chronological ignorance. It is possible to capture so many nonmono- 
tonic logics, because the system in question does not have a component that is 
responsible for the resolution of argument conflicts. 
(7) Recently, in 1995, the Thai researcher Dung [9] presented a mathematical ar- 
gumentation theory, in which an argument is an abstract entity whose role is 
determined by its so-called attack relations to other arguments. Acceptability is a 
fundamental concept in Dung’s theory. An argument is accepted by S if and only 
if S attacks all attackers of that argument. In Dung’s theory, no special attention 
is paid to the internal structure of the arguments. (The latter is not meant as a 
value judgement.) 
Why are there so many different argumentation systems? Our explanation is that the 
area is relatively young. No consensus has been reached yet on essential issues, such as 
the representation of arguments and their precise form of interaction. Each researcher, 
or group of researchers, has its own way to deal with these issues, which results in a 
large diversity of argumentation systems. 
There are a number of problems with existing systems. 
(a) A problem with OSCAR is that, in some cases, >-introduction produces falla- 
cious arguments. These fallacious arguments unjustifiably defeat lines of reason- 
ing that actually should emerge undefeated. This problem is further discussed 
and illustrated with a counterexample in [55]. 
(b) The mutual dependency relations between interfering arguments are difficult to 
handle for most systems. In Loui’s system [21], it is possible to construct a 
cycle of three arguments in which each argument defeats its successor. With this 
cycle it remains unclear which of the three arguments should remain undefeated. 
This problem is caused by Loui’s notion of defeat, that makes it possible that 
short arguments can be defeated by longer arguments that, in turn, may con- 
tain isomorphic copies of the shorter argument. These copies can, for the same 
reason, be defeated by other long arguments, thus constructing a chain of suc- 
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cessive defeaters. If the ends fit, such a chain can be made into a cycle of three 
successively defeating arguments. 
(c) Most systems have difficulties with a situation in which it is not clear which 
argument should win. One possibility is to keep up all arguments, and continue 
reasoning with them in different “worlds”. This approach has become known 
as credulous reasoning. (Cf. [42] : multiple extensions; [7] : multiple contexts; 
[ 271: multiple belief spaces; [ 281: clusters of worlds.) A second possibility is 
to do away with every argument, on the basis of the idea that the arguments neu- 
tralize each other. This approach as become known as skeptical reasoning. (Cf. 
[ 21,30,36,45] : collective defeat. Horty and Thomason [161 introduce a mech- 
anism of skeptical defeat that is slightly more refined.) A third possibility is to 
introduce three classes of arguments-“ultimately undefeated”, “provisionally un- 
defeated” and “ultimately defeated”-such that all arguments hat are involved in 
an ambiguous conflict are considered as “provisionally undefeated”. (Cf. [ 361.) 
Prakken uses a similar triple “preferred”, “defensible”, “defeated”. (Cf. [ 391.) 
The problem is that none of these options is completely satisfactory. In [55] 
several examples are adduced and elaborated to show that, in some situations, 
the above approaches lack expressive power in order to describe counterbalanced 
or ambiguous argument conflicts. In a nutshell, the problem is that if, for in- 
stance, ~1, q, rt and 72 are arguments such that ~1 interferes with a2 and 71 
interferes with 72, then all arguments “stay alive” in different worlds in the cred- 
ulous approach, “eliminate” each other in the skeptical approach, or are placed 
in the grey pool of “provisionally defeated” arguments in Pollock’s/Prakken’s 
approach. It is not possible to formally express, for example, that (+I depends 
only on (~2, or that (~1 does not depend on 71. 
(d) Almost all systems include a detailed and elaborated specification of defeat 
among arguments. A representative example is [21]. (Cf. point (3) above.) 
It is not only indicated which argument is stronger than another, but it is also 
indicated why an argument is stronger than another argument. However, for most 
of these detailed specifications of defeat it is possible to construct counterex- 
amples for which an unintentional argument emerges undefeated. To obtain a 
counterexample, it suffices to construct wo syntactically isomorphic but seman- 
tically different situation descriptions, uch that an undefeated argument is right 
according to the first semantic interpretation but wrong according to the second 
semantic interpretation. (Cf. [ 511.) Thus, it can be shown that detailed and 
carefully specified definitions of defeat are often overspecified. An overspecified 
definition “takes sides” in cases where it is better to abstain. At the other side 
of the spectrum we find Lin and Shoham’s argument system [20]. In [ 201, a 
logical hierarchy between arguments i absent. This lacuna makes it impossible 
to determine which arguments remain undefeated. It is reasonable to consider 
the latter as a problem. 
In this paper, a theory of abstract argumentation systems is developed. An abstract 
argumentation system is a collection of defeasible proofs, called arguments, of varying 
conclusive force. 
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In the proposed theory, the above problems are solved in the following way. 
(a) To avoid problems with suppositional arguments (cf. [ 361)) they are excluded 
from our theory. Our approach is to put the issue temporarily on the shelves until 
there is a better understanding of more simple forms of defeasible reasoning. 
(b) The anomaly in Loui’s system [21] is avoided by the stipulation that argu- 
ments cannot become stronger if they are made longer. This natural and intuitive 
principle is enforced in Definition 2.12. 
(c) An abstract argumentation system can handle situations in which it is not clear 
which argument should win. Within an abstract argumentation system, it is possi- 
ble to describe critical situations, not only with provisionally defeated arguments 
[ 33,36,45] and extensions [7,9,27,42], but also with a defeasible ntailment 
relation /-Q that is able to formally distinguish and express the various depen- 
dency relations across (groups of) arguments. The latter is demonstrated, among 
others, in Example 4.31. 
(d) In abstract argumentation systems, potentially involved criteria of adjudication 
are put into an order of conclusive force. This order is supposed to contain all the 
relevant information concerning the relative strength among arguments. The order 
of conclusive force used is partial, which means that some pairs of arguments 
are incomparable. In some situations, even rno~r arguments cannot be compared. 
This “inability” is not necessarily disadvantageous. Sometimes, there is simply 
not enough information to arrange a complete hierarchy among arguments. In 
such situations, incomparability is still better than overspecification and arbitrary 
conflict resolution. 
That we speak of abstract argumentation systems in particular, is motivated by re- 
search of which the findings are reported in [ 5 11. In that paper, we were interested 
in the feasibility of formulating general, but nontrivial, principles for determining the 
relative strength among arguments. This has been done because a notion of conclusive 
force lays the basis for a theory of defeat and, conversely, atheory of defeat presupposes 
a notion of conclusive force in which we can speak about the relative strength of argu- 
ments. The conclusion was that, in a formal theory that works on the basis of syntactical 
principles, it is difficult to formulate general but nontrivial principles that consistently 
pronounce upon the conclusive force of symbolically represented arguments. Conclusive 
force is not only determined by syntactical structure. Generally, further information is 
needed from the semantics of the domain of discourse to have a definite saying in which 
argument is stronger than the other. In any case, the whole issue seems to be sufficiently 
difficult to avoid it altogether, and to assume that an order on arguments already has 
been given. This assumption saves us from the responsibility of telling how and why 
a particular argument should overrule any other particular argument. The present paper 
thus attempts to understand the workings of defeat in its own right, freed from the 
involvements with specificity and conclusive force in which it was enmeshed in the 
earlier discussions. 
In spite of these abstractions (or simplifications, for that matter), and given the impov- 
erishment of the background language (there are, for instance, no genuine propositional 
connectives), the texture of the resulting formalism is surprisingly rich. This indicates 
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that argument has a meta-theory that must be taken serious. I have done this by trying 
to embody the most interesting ideas in argument and present the material clearly. By 
doing so, I hope to convince mathematicians that argumentation theory has an inter- 
esting mathematics. Further, I invite non-logicians to work on argument. A number of 
computational and combinatorial problems formulated in this paper are not solved yet. 
I am sure that attempts to solve these problems will lead to new and interesting results. 
2. Basic concepts 
An abstract argumentation system is a static framework in which the basic notions of 
argumentation obtain a well-defined meaning. In and of itself, it does not prescribe how 
argumentation should be performed, which arguments are in force, or in what manner 
defeasible information should be manipulated. It merely attempts to provide a conceptual 
framework in which different ideas on argumentation can be worked out. 
Definition 2.1. An abstract argumentation system is a triple 
d=(L,R,<) (1) 
where L is a language, R is a set of rules of inference, and < is a reflexive and transitive 
order on arguments. 2 
Definition 2.2 (Language). A language is a set 13, containing a distinguished element 
The language L is not subject to particular constraints. Any set will do, provided 
it contains a distinguished element -L that represents a contradictory proposition. In 
particular, sentences do not need to be constructed with the help of logical connectives 
such as A, V, 7, --+, >, and z. In the theory of abstract argumentation systems, we 
abstract away from the structure of the logical language. We do this because it is 
possible to produce a rich meta-theory, even on the basis of a poor language. (As this 
paper will show.) Refining C with logical connectives is always an option in a later 
stage. Elements of a language are called sentences. Every now and then we call them 
propositions, although it is generally known that sentences and propositions are not 
exactly the same. (Cf. [46,58] .) For the present, their distinction is irrelevant. 
The rules R are given in terms of C and determine what inferences are possible. 
Definition 2.3 (Rules of inference). Let L be a language. 3 
( 1) A strict rule of inference is a formula of the form 41,. . . , q5,, --f #I where 
$I*....$% is a finite, possibly empty, sequence in L and 4 is a member of 13. 
* An abstract argumentation system is a (conservative) extension of the notion of proof system. (Cf. 
Definition 4.34.) 
3 If we are very precise, we should additionally stipulate that Lfl { +, =s} = 0. Otherwise, the meta-language 
would mix with the object language unintentionally. 
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Fig. I. Four rules. 
(2) A defeusible rule of inference is a formula of the form 41,. . . , r#+, + 4 where 
@I,....#” is a finite, possibly empty, sequence in C and 4 is a member of .L. 
A rule of inference is a strict or a defeasible rule of inference. 
Rules of inference are meta-linguistic expressions. Although rules are defined in terms 
of 13, it is not so that they are elements of L. Thus, R II L = 0. Because L has no a 
priori structure, the rules are supposed to be domain independent. (Just like the rules 
of inference of propositional logic are domain independent.) If one wishes to represent 
domain-specific rules (and one will in later stages), the language L must be refined 
with logical connectives. But domain-specific applications are not the primary concern of 
this paper. In contrast with other theories of defeasible argumentation, notably [ 30,361, 
the theory has two kinds of rules, -+ and +.4 Further, it does not know of so-called 
undercutting rules of inference. 5 
Example 2.4. Let L = {p, q, r} U {I}. Then p, q, I, r +I; p * q; Lp + q; and 
+ r are rules of inference constructed with elements from 15 (Cf. Fig. 1.) More 
examples of rules of inference are p, q 4 r; p +l; p, q + r; and + q. 
Examples of non-rules are p,q +; -+; +-I, 1,~; and p + q,r. In other sys- 
tems, the last two formulas would have been allowed, giving rise to rules with mul- 
tiple consequents. In our system, these last two formulas would split into {+1, +_L, 
=+ p} and {p + q,p + r}, respectively. Rules with multiple consequents complicate 
the notion of argument considerably, and are therefore not included in our theory. Fur- 
thermore, we note that rules do not belong to the language, so that repeated use of -+ as 
well as + is forbidden: (p -q)~r;(p--,q)--t(p~q);p~(p-t(p~(...))) 
are invalid constructions. 
The third component of an argumentation system, the order <, is a relation that is 
defined on arguments. (Cf. Definition 2.12.) 
4 Pollock has one: -+, while Nute has three: -+, +-, and ?+. 
5 In Nute’s logic of defeasible reasoning [30], there is an additional third type of rule of inference, called 
a defeater. In Pollock’s theory [ 31,331, this third type of rule is called an undercutting defeater. In our 
theory, an undercutting defeater would look like 4 1, . . , (b,, ?+ c$. In order the understand the function of 
an undercutting defeater, it is probably best to assume temporarily that 12 is closed under negation, i.e., that 
-$ E C whenever do E C, for every I$ E C. The meaning of an undercutting defeater is then defined as 
follows. If 41,. ,q&, + q5 means that 41,. . . , 4” is an absolute reason to derive q5, if qf~t , . , c#,, =+ qb 
means that 41,. , qbn is a good reason to derive Cp, then 41,. , qSn ?d qt~ means that ~$1,. . ,c#I,, is a 
good reason not to derive ~4. Thus, a defeater ~$1,. , $I,, ? -+ 4 undercuts the rule ~$1, . ,& + -4, 
without supporting 4. In Section 4.5, it will be argued that undercutting defeaters can always be defined on 
the basis of the two other types of rules, provided L is rich enough to account for strict and defeasible rules 
of inference. 






r ‘$P pj-+ 
PdQ 
(7 r 
Fig. 2. Three arguments. 
Arguments 
Chaining rules together into trees, we get arguments. 6 In Fig. 2, three arguments 
are displayed. The premises of the first, second and third argument are {p, q}, {q, r} 
and {p}, respectively. The conclusions are s, p, and r; the sentences are {p, q, r, s}, 
{p, q, r, s}, and {p, q, r}; the assumptions are {s}, {s}, and 0; the lengths of all three 
arguments are equal to 3 (not 2) ; the sizes of the arguments are 6,5, and 4, respectively. 
The first two arguments are defeasible; the third argument is strict. 
Below, the notion of argument is defined precisely. 
Definition 2.5 (Argument). Let R be a set of rules. An argument has premises, a 
conclusion, sentences (or propositions), assumptions, ubarguments, top-arguments, a 
length, and a size. These are abbreviated by corresponding prefixes. An argument u is 
(1) 
(2) 
a member of L-in that case, 
prem(a) = {a}, conc( c) = cr, sent(a) = {CT}, 
asm(a) = 0, sub(a) = {u}, top(a) = {a}, 
Zength( a) = 1, size(U) = 1; 
or 
a formula of the form (+I,. . . ,cT,, --f qb where (~1,.  . ,(T, is a finite, possibly 
empty, sequence of arguments, uch that conc(gt ) = 41,. . . , conc(cr,) = q5,, for 
some rule 41,. . . , qbn + q5 in R, and 4 6 sent(al ) U 4 . . U sent(a,)-in that 
case, 
prem(cr) =prem(al) U.+aUprem(a,), 
conc(cr) = 4, 
sent(a) = sent(al) U... Usent(0,) U {qS}, 
asm( a) =asm(~l) U---Uasm(cn,), 
sub(g) =sub(a,) u...usub(a,) U{(T), 
top(v) = (7,). . . 9Tn + d, / 71 f toP(m), *. * ,Tn E top(an)} u (443 
length(c) = max{length(cr+l), . . . , Zength(a,)} + 1, 
size(a) = size(al) +. . - + size(a,) + 1; 
or 
6 For philosophical considerations on exactly what is an argument, the reader is referred to [6] or [ 581. 
Here, arguments are just formulas. 
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(3) a formula of the form (71,. . . , CT,, 3 C#J where ~1.. . . , CT,, is a finite, possibly 
empty, sequence of arguments, such that conc(al> = 41,. . . , conc(c+,) = qb,, 
for some rule 41,. . . , & + C#J in R, and 4 q! sent(q) U . . . U sent( u,,); for 
assumptions we have 
asm( a) = asm( (+I) u . . . u dwelt) u (4); 
premises, conclusions, and other attributes are defined as in (2). 
Arguments of type ( 1) are atomic arguments; arguments of types (2) and (3) are 
composite arguments. Thus, atomic arguments are language elements. How these ele- 
ments will be considered depends on the context. 
Remark 2.6. From the above definition it follows that arguments may have identical 
sentences, as long as they do not occur more than once in the same branch. If an 
argument has a pair of identical sentences in the same branch, it is constructed with the 
help of a subargument and a subsubargument that support identical conclusions. This 
clearly is an elementary fallacy. (Cf. [ 1.51.) For example, Fig. 3 displays something 
that is not an argument because r occurs twice in the same branch. 
Remark 2.7. Often, we abuse notation and write (~1,. . . , u,, -+ u to denote that cr 
is an argument, constructed from ~1,. . . ,gn using the rule 41,. . . , c$,, -+ qb, with 
conc((Tt > = $751) . . . ) conc(~,) = 4” and cone(a) = 4. The arguments (~1,. . . ,(+,, are 
referred to as the immediate subarguments of a; the rule 41,. . . , c$,, -+ c$ is referred 
to as the top-rule of (T. The same terminology is used for arguments that end with a 
defeasible rule of inference. Further, we omit parentheses wherever possible. With this 
convention, ((p + q) + r) + s is written as p + q + r + s, since the latter cannot 
beparsedas,e.g.,p+(q+r)+sorp+(q+(r+s)). 
An argument has, besides subarguments, also super-arguments, and besides top- 
arguments, also bottom-arguments. (Super-arguments and bottom-arguments are used 
in Definition 6.9 and further.) 
Definition 2.8 (Super-argument, bottom-argument). Let (+ and r be arguments. Instead 
of (+ E Sub(T) we often write cr L r. Further, sup(v) = {p 1 (+ E sub(p)} and bot(cr) = 
{P I (+ E fOP(P 
.:G II-+ P / S r 4 
Fig. 3. A fallacy. 
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Example 2.9. Let L = {p, q, r, s} U {I} and 
R={p--rq; p,q-+r; q,r+s; r,s+p}. 
Let u = q, r =+ s. Then 
prem(a) = (4, r}, cant(a) = S, 
sent(a) = (4, r, s}, asm(a) = {S}, 
sub(cr) = (9, r} U (4, r * s}, sup(a) = (4, r * s; r, (4, r * s) --) p}, 
top(a) = (9, r * s} U {s}, 
hot(a) = {(p + q), (p,q + r) * s; 
(p-+q),r*s; q,(p,q-+r) +s; q,r*s}, 
lengfh( a) = 2, size(g) = 3. 
Let r = p. Then 
prem(r) = {P}, conc( 7) = p, 
sent(T) = {p}, asm(u) = 0, 
SUb(7) = {P}, 
SUP(T) = {P>P -+ 4) 
U{p,q--‘r; (p+q),r*.s; (p+4),(pv4+r)*s}, 
U{(p--tq)~(p~(p-+q) +r) *s), 
top(T) = {P}> bot(~) = {r, (q, r * s) -p~U{rys+p~U{p~l 
length(7) = 1, size(r) = 1. 
(2) 
Definition 2.10. An argument u is strict if u E C or (~1,. . . , CT,, -+ (T where (+I,. . . , (T, 
are strict arguments. An argument is defeusible if it is not strict. 
With this terminology, an argument is either strict or defeasible, but never both strict 
and defeasible at the same time. 
Definition 2.11. Let L be a language and let P be a subset of C. 
( 1) An argument is based on P if the premises of that argument is a subset of P; a 
set of arguments is bused on P if all its members are based on P. 
(2) The set of all arguments that are based on P, is denoted by arguments(P) ; the 
set of all strict arguments that are based on P is denoted by strict(P); the set 
of all defeasible arguments that are based on P is denoted by defeusible( P). 
(3) A member of C is bused on P if it is the conclusion of an argument that is based 
on P; strictly bused on P if it is the conclusion of a strict argument that is based 
on P; defeasibly based on P if it is the conclusion of a defeasible argument that 
is based on P. 
Up to here, the theory does not much deviate from what is accustomed in classical 
proof theory. (Cf. [ 3,40,41] .) There is a defeasible proof system, there are proofs, 
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rules of inference, and other logical attributes. The only difference is that everything 
comes in two different sorts: there are strict rules and defeasible rules, strict argu- 
ments and defeasible arguments, strict conclusions and defeasible conclusions, and so 
forth. 
A characteristic distinction between argumentation systems and proof systems is that 
arguments, unlike proofs, vary in conclusive force. 
Conclusive force 
The third component of an argumentation system is the order <. This order determines 
the relative difference in strength among arguments. 
Definition 2.12 (Order of conclusive force). Let c and 7 be arguments. If (T 6 7, 
then r is as strong as U, and if (T < r, then r is stronger than (+. An order of 
conclusive force satisfies, besides reflexivity and transitivity, three additional condi- 
tions. 
( 1) Upwards well-founded. There are no infinite chains gl < (~2 < . . . < (T, < . . . . 
(2) Monotonically non-increasing. If u C 7, then 7 < (+, for all u and 7. 
(3) Propagates through strict rules. If (~1,. . . , CT~ + CT, then Ui < (T, for some 
1 <i<n. 
The first condition ensures that defeat is a finite process. The second and third conditions 
ensure that the notion of conclusive force is distributed properly over arguments. All 
three conditions are essential to the proofs of subsequent results. 
Throughout the paper, we assume that arguments do not vie with each other in- 
definitely, that arguments do not become stronger if they are made longer, and that 
there is no mysterious loss in conclusive force through strict rules of inference. These 
three conditions are our axioms of conclusive force, which we deliberately have cho- 
sen in order to derive interesting principles of defeat. At the same time, we claim 
that these three conditions are sufficiently general to ensure that no interesting distri- 
bution of conclusive force is excluded beforehand. This claim is further underpinned 
in [55]. 
In the theory of abstract argumentation systems, it is not indicated how the strength 
of arguments is determined. Note that it is unimportant to find an adequate criteria to 
determine the difference in strength among arguments. Many researchers have proposed 
general criteria for adjudicating between competing lines of argument. (Cf. [ 16,22,30, 
37,391.) However, there is a “clash of intuitions” at this moment on the validity and 
relevance of such criteria. Most researchers agree on the principle of specificity, that says 
that arguments that are more “on point” are preferred. Poole introduced specificity in 
[ 371, after which alternative definitions were proposed by Nute [ 301, Loui [ 221, Poole 
[ 381, and Prakken [ 391. Other criteria to compare arguments include directness [ 221, 
pre-emption [ 161, combined defeat 1391, number of favorable factors with a ceteris 
paribus comparison [2], and accumulation of numerical strength [36], In this paper, 
we do not go into this difficult matter. Accordingly, we do not commit to a specific 
method to compare arguments in conclusive force. 
236 G.A.W. Vreeswijk/Artljicial Intelligence 90 (1997) 225-279 






Basic order. For all u and r, we set u < r if and only if u is defeasible or 
r is strict. A basic order is indeed the most basic order that is in line with the 
ideas of defeasible argumentation. (It trivially obeys the conditions of Definition 
2.12.) 
Number of defeasible steps. Not very realistic, but this order proves to be handy 
in examples and counterexamples: (+ < r if and only if 1~1~ 6 Iu(+., where 1. I+. 
stands for the number of defeasible arrows in an argument. It is only upwards 
well-founded if the length of the arguments has an upper bound. 
Weakest link. With this order, an argument is as strong as its weakest link. 
Formally, this amounts to an extension of an order < on R to an order 6 on 
arguments, in a conservative manner. To ensure that arguments are as strong as 
their weakest link, the following additional conditions must be satisfied. 
(i) (As weak as the weakest link.) If u is an argument with top-rule 
@1,.**9&l ~~,thena~(~l,...,~,~~). 
(ii) (As strong as the weakest link.) If ~1, . . . , u,, + (+ is an argument with 
top-rule 41, . . . , #,, + 4, and there is no 1 6 i < n such that ui Q (T, then 
(41,. . . ,4n * 4) < o-‘. 
Thus, conditions (i) and (ii) induce a ranking on arguments based on one of 
the rules. Condition (i) applies the principle of the weakest link; condition (ii) 
ensures that no argument is weaker than necessary. Definition 2.12 further ensures 
that the initial order on rules extends properly over arguments. Because the 
extended order compares arguments on the basis of rules, it follows that atomic 
arguments (i.e., arguments in C) are incomparable with respect to this order. 
Preferring the most specific argument. For all (T and r we have (+ < r if u is 
defeasible and r is strict, or (+ and r are both defeasible, but the premises of r 
are based on the conclusions of subarguments of (+, i.e., prem(T) is based on 
cone o sub( CT). As it stands, this order does not fit in the shackles of Definition 
2.12, but if we additionally assume that arguments cannot become arbitrary long, 
then all conditions will be met. 
As we have argued in the introduction, we have chosen to take the actual definition 
of Q for granted. Working on a general and universally applicable criterion to correctly 
adjudicate among conflicting lines of argumentation is a difficult enterprise. The problem 
is that, as soon as the alleged criterion prefers the right argument on one benchmark 
problem, it is at fault with another. Recently, it has been argued that this complication 
cannot be avoided [ 17,511. It is particularly difficult to adjudicate among competing 
arguments if one does not know what these arguments are about. Thus, syntactic prin- 
ciples to decide among competing arguments do not exist or will be extremely weak. 
In this connection, it may be of interest to note that, as far as existing literature is 
concerned, the emphasis is always on the flaws and the fallacies, i.e., on the negative 
aspect of the matter, and hardly ever on the matter of conclusive force itself. That is 
understandable, because it is easier to point at weak spots than to speak for the overall 
quality of an argument. 
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Fig. 4. P is undermined by 7 because (~1 < 7. 
The concept of undermining 
An argument is said to undermine a set of arguments, if it dominates at least one 
element of that set. If a set of arguments is undermined by another argument, it cannot 
uphold or maintain all of its members in case of a conflict. The concept of undermining 
is important because it is one of the two building blocks of the theory. (The other is 
incompatibility.) 
Because undermining is related to order, we recollect some essential (and possibly 
familiar) terminology. 
Definition 2.14. Let 2 be a set of arguments. An element u is a <-least element of 2 
if, for every r E 2, we have u < r. An element u is a <-minimal element of 2 if, for 
every r E 2, we have u = r whenever 7 < u. Similarly, the set 2 may have <-greatest 
or <-maximal elements. 
With the present order, least elements as well as minimal elements are not uniquely 
defined, and may not exist. Moreover, minimal elements do not necessarily have to be 
least elements, and least elements do not necessarily have to be minimal elements. The 
same holds for greatest elements and maximal elements. 
Definition 2.15. An argument r is an underminer of a set of arguments 2 if u < r, 
for some u E 2. In this case, the set 2 is undermined by T (see Fig. 4). 
The concept of undermining causes a “paradox”. On the one hand, a large set of 
arguments exhibits cogency, in the sense that it contains a large number of arguments. 
On the other hand, a large set of arguments is undermined more easily than a small one. 
If a set of arguments is large, there is a realistic chance that it will contain an argument 
that is weaker than some argument outside that set. Thus, many arguments adduce much 
evidence but are hard to maintain collectively. This fact will play an important role in 
the rest of the theory. 
238 G.A. W Vreeswijk/Art$icial Intelligence 90 (1997) 225-279 
3. Compatibility 
Compatibility is a generalization of consistency in propositional logic. The reason to 
use ‘compatibility” (instead of “consistency”) is that we do not work in a conventional 
logical context. If the term “consistency” would be used here, it would invoke more 
than intended. 
Definition 3.1 (Contradiction). An argument (T is in contradiction if cone(a) =-L. 
An argument in contradiction is also called a contradictory argument. 
Definition 3.2 (Compatibility). A subset P of C is incompatible if there exists a strict 
argument in contradiction, that is based on P. A subset of L is compatible if it is 
not incompatible. An incompatible subset of C is minimally incompatible if all proper 
subsets are compatible. 
Example 3.3. Let L = {p, q, r, s} u {I} and let R = {p + r; p, q + s; r, s +I}. 
Then all subsets of {p,q, s}, {p, r}, and {q. r} are compatible, while all supersets of 
{p, q, r}, and {r, s} are incompatible. Moreover, both {p, q, r}, and {r, s} are minimally 
incompatible. 
Example 3.4. Let C = {p, q} U {I} and let R = {p, q +I}. Then all subsets of 
C - {I} are compatible. In particular, the set {p, q} is compatible. 
Compatibility naturally extends to sets of arguments. Thus, a set of arguments LT: is 
compatible if conc( 2) is compatible. 
A minimally incompatible set (of formulas or arguments, that does not matter) is 
always finite. This follows from the definition of minimal incompatibility and the fact that 
arguments always have a finite number of premises. This observation is of importance 
to the proposition below. 
The following proposition formulates an elementary result about the interaction be- 
tween conclusive force and compatibility. The result will be used in Section 6.3. 
Proposition 3.5. Let < be an order of conclusive force on arguments. Then every 
minimally incompatible set of arguments has a <-least element. 
Proof. Let 2 be a minimally incompatible set of arguments. We show that X has a least 
element with induction on the number of arguments in Z. If 2 contains precisely one 
argument, then the proposition clearly follows. If 2 contains more than one argument, 
we reason as follows. According to Definition 3.2 there is a strict argument, 7, in contra- 
diction based on the conclusions of 2. Let q&, . . . , C#J~ -+ q!~ be a smallest subargument 
of 7 (which is evidently a rule). Because this rule is a subargument of an argument 
that is based on conclusions of 2, the premises of #I,. . . , h -+ Q1 are also based on 
the conclusions of 2. Therefore, we may assume that _Z = 2’ U {al,. . . , a,}, such that 
conc(cq) =@I,..., conc(u,) = (b,,. Let c~ =&f (+I,. . . , CT,, + 4. It follows that the set 
G.A.W Vreeswijk/Art$cial Intelligence 90 (1997) 225-279 239 
2’ U {a} is minimally incompatible. (Here we assume the minimality of 2.) Because 
2’ u {CT} is minimally incompatible and contains fewer elements than 2, we may apply 
our induction hypothesis, which tells us that 2” U {a} contains a least element. If CT is 
that least element, then we appeal to Definition 2.12(3), from which we may assume 
that, for some 1 < j < n, we have aj < c+. Moreover, from Definition 2.12(2) we may 
assume that, for all 1 < i < n, we have (+ < (+i, so that, for all 1 < i < n, we have 
aj 6 ui. This suffices to conclude that oj is a least element of 2:. In the other case, if 
u is not a least element of JS’ U {a}, it must follow that some element U’ of 2’ is a 
least element of 2’ U {CT}. Again appealing to Definition 2.12(2), we know that, for all 
1 < i < n, we have u < pi, so that (+’ also is a least element of 2’. 0 
Proposition 3.5 tells us that, for every group of conflicting arguments in which every 
argument is essential to the conflict, there exists a weakest argument that is as weak 
as all the others. Obviously, such an argument is considered first when it comes to a 
resolution of the conflict. 
4. Theory of warrant 
The objective of a theory of warrant is to determine which arguments are in force, 
and which conclusions are warranted. There is no reasoning and, hence, no appeal to 
argumentation procedures and/or protocols for dispute. 
4.1. Base set 
Arguments are in force and conclusions are warranted relative to a set of basic 
information. Such a set of basic information is called a base set. In order to avoid 
conflicts between strict arguments, a base set must be compatible. 
Definition 4.1. A base set is a finite compatible subset of L. 
A base set contains irreducible information. It is the point of departure in forward 
argumentation, and the final stopping place in backward justification. Examples of base 
sets are: sets of necessary and contingent facts, current fact situations [ 21, first principles 
in a case study, case descriptions and, in dialectics, initial concessions in a debate. That 
a base set must be finite is crucial to the theory of argumentation sequences. (Cf. 
Proposition 6.4.) 
4.2. Defeat 
Defeat is the most elementary notion of warrant, as it is the most elementary relation 
on arguments that involves compatibility as well as conclusive force. It lies at the basis 
of many dialectical concepts. The notion of enablement, for instance, can be stated in 
terms of defeat. Also other important dialectical concepts can be expressed with the help 
of this elementary notion. 
240 GA. W Vreeswijk/Art@cial Intelligence 90 (1997) 225-279 
Definition 4.2 (Defeater). Let P be a base set, and let (T be an argument. A set 
of arguments 2 is a defeater of (+ if it is incompatible with this argument and not 
undermined by it; in this case (+ is defeated by 2, and 2 defeats CT. 2 is a minimal 
defeater of (+ if all its proper subsets do not defeat u. 
Example 4.3. Consider the abstract argumentation system A with language L = 
{p, q, r, s} U {I} with rules 
R={p+q,p+s,q+r,r+s}U(q,r,s-+I} 
and with the +-count order on arguments. (Cf. Example 2.13(2).) Let (T = p =S q + r 
and 
~={p,p~q,p~s,p~q~r~s}. 
With this set of arguments, 
(3) 
. {p + q} is not a defeater of (+, since it is compatible with u, 
. {p + s} is not a defeater of CT, for the same reason, 
. {p + q,p + s} is a defeater of u, since q, r, s --+I, 
. {p,p =S q,p + s} is a defeater of u, since q, r, s +I, 
. g,; =+ q,p + s,p + q + r =+ s} is not a defeater of (T, since it is undermined 
Thus, ,Z contains various defeaters of u, without being a defeater of u itself. The set 
_X does not defeat u, because it is undermined by u. Small subsets of _Z also do not 
defeat u, because they are not incompatible with u. Maybe it is convenient to remember 
defeaters as the lean and mean elements of this theory. They must stay small in order not 
to be undermined by other arguments; meanwhile they must support enough conclusions 
to form a contradiction with the conclusions of other arguments. 
4.3. Enablement 
The basic idea behind enablement, is that enabled is “not defeated”. An argument u 
is enabled by a set of arguments H if and only if all subarguments of u, including CT, 
are not defeated by subsets of 2’: 
Definition 4.4. Let P be a base set, and let _Z be a set of arguments. An argument u 
is enabled by 2 on the basis of P, written PI= N u, if 
( 1) the set P contains a; or 
(2) forsomeargumentsut ,..., u,wehavePjzNul ,..., u,andur ,..., u,-+u; 
or 
(3) for some arguments ul,. . . ,u,, we have PI2 N ~1,. . . ,u,, and q,. . . ,u,, + u 
and 2 does not contain defeaters of u. 
(With Plx-ul,.. .,u,, wemean: PIZ-ual and . . . and PIz-u,,.) 
Definition 4.4 consists of three clauses. The first clause simply ensures that every 
element of P, as a basic element, is enabled. The second clause enforces that the 
property of enablement propagates through strict arguments. The third clause forms the 
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heart of Definition 4.4. It is similar to the second clause, upto the additional condition 
on 2 and (+. The rationale behind this additional condition is that (+ is enabled by 2 
only if all subsets of 2 are either compatible with (+ or undermined by g. 
Example 4.5 (Enablement). Consider the abstract argumentation system A with lan- 
guage C = {p, q, r} U {I}, with rules 
R={p~q,q~r,p~~}u{q,s--tl} (4) 
and with a basic order on arguments <. Let P = {p}. Let us, by way of example, see 
whether the argument p + q + r is enabled by 2 = {p,p + q} on the basis of P. 
Since p + q =+ r ends with a defeasible rule, we are referred to Definition 4.4(3), 
which states that p + q + r is enabled by 2 = {p,p + q} on the basis of P if and only 
if p + q is enabled by 2, and 2 does not contain defeaters of p =S q =+ r. Since the 
entire set 2 is compatible with p + q + r, the last condition is readily fulfilled. Hence, 
the problem whether p + q + r is enabled by 2, reduces to the problem whether its 
immediate subargument p + q is enabled by 2. Following the same line of reasoning 
as above, this problem reduces one step further (via Definition 4.4(3)) to the problem 
whether p is enabled by 2. This, however, follows easily from Definition 4.4( l), since 
p E P. Hence, the argument p + q is enabled by 2 which, on its turn, implies that 
p + q + r is enabled by 2. 
This example is pretty straightforward. An example that works out differently, is the 
following. 
Example 4.6 (Enablement). Consider the abstract argumentation system A of Example 
4.5, with P = {p}. Let us now determine whether p + q is enabled by 2 = {p,p + q, 
p + s} on the basis of P. Since p =s q ends with a defeasible rule, we are referred to 
Definition 4.4( 3) once again, which states that p + q is enabled by 2 = {p,p + q, 
p + s} on the basis of P if and only if p is enabled by 2, and 2 does not contain 
defeaters of p + q. But the singleton set 2~ =&f {p =s s} is a defeater of p =5 q. 
Hence, the argument p + q is not enabled by 2. Note that this is so, even though 
p + q is a member of 2 itself. 
The notion of enablement obtains further meaning if it operates on sets. 
Definition 4.7 (Enablement operator). Let P be a base set, and let 2 be a set of 
arguments. Then enablep( 2) denotes the set of arguments {U 1 PI2 N a}. 
The notation tries to express that the enablement operator works on sets of argu- 
ments, relative to a certain base set. 7 Before we discuss some of the properties of the 
enablement operator, we elaborate a bit further on the material of the previous examples. 
’ For a long time, I wavered between using enablep (2) or enablez( I’). The notation enabler(P) is an 
alternative that is more in line with subsequent terminology (using the base set as the main argument), but 
turns away from the idea that enablement is an operator on sets of ruguments. The last idea is, later on, 
required by the theory. 
242 G.A.W. Vreeswijk/Arti$icial Intelligence 90 (1997) 225-279 
Example 4.8. Consider the abstract argumentation system A of Example 4.5, with 
P = {p}. Then 
enablep(p) = {P,P * q,p * 4 * r,p =+ s}, 
enablep(p,p * 4) = {p,p * q,p =+- q =+ r}, 
enublep(p,p * s) = {p,p * s}, 
enublep(p,p * q,p * s> = {p}, 
enublep(p,p~q,p~q~r)={p,p~q,p~q~r}, 
enublep(p,p * q,p * q * r,p * $1 = {p}. 
This example shows a number of characteristic properties of the enablement operator. 
To begin with, we see that, for every set of arguments 2, if 2 is small, then enublep( 2) 
is large. Conversely, if 2 is large, then enublep( 2) is small. Further, we see that 
enablement is not reflexive, that is, we do not always have that 2 C enublep( 2). 
Especially if 2 is large, it might disable (i.e., defeat) some of its own elements. This 
is because large sets usually are incompatible. 
The following proposition will be used in the proof of Proposition 4.33. 
Proposition 4.9. Let P be a base set, and let 2 be a set of arguments hat is compatible. 
Then 2 is included in enublep ( 2). 8 
Proof. Let u E 2. Since u is compatible with every subset of 2 - {a}, it is obviously 
enabled by Z. 0 
Thus if .2 is compatible, then 2 C enublep (2). Further, if 2 = urguments( P), then 
enublep (2) C 2. This pair of crossing inclusions suggests that, in some situations, 
typically those in which 2 is neither too big nor too small, the set 2 enables precisely 
itself. Later on, these sets, which are stable under the enablement operator, will be 
called extensions of P. Let us consider other non-properties of the enablement operator. 
Besides not being reflexive, the enablement operator is not idempotent as well. From 
this, it follows that it might be interesting to iterate the enablement operator to see what 
comes out. This will be done in a later stage of this paper. 
The enablement operator has few regularities. In fact, the only regular property of 
enablement is that it reverses inclusion: 
8A converse of this proposition-inclusion implies compatibility-holds as well, but its proof is more 
involved, and the result is not needed in the rest of the theory. Therefore, the proof that compatibility is 
fully expressible in terms of enablement is left as an “exercise”. A related question is what is expressed 
by the inclusion enablep( 2) c 8. We conjecture that this inclusion holds if and only if P contains all 
its underminers and is not extendible. (Not extendible: (T $Z S implies incompatibility of S U {CT}.) If this 
would be so, then enablement is able to characterize, besides compatibility, also conclusive force. This in turn 
would imply that a theory of abstract argumentation could be defined in even more abstract terms. Instead of 
beginning with the notions of conclusive force and compatibility, it would then suffice to begin with the notion 
of enablement. In more concrete terms, this would mean that it is possible to talk about principles of defeat, 
without ever referring to contradictions and the conclusive force of arguments. [We leave the conjecture. on 
the characterization of enablep (P) C P an open issue.] 
G.A.M? VreeswijkIArtijicial Intelligence 90 (1997) 225-279 243 
Proposition 4.10. Let P be a base set. Let 21 and & be two sets of arguments such 
that 21 C $2. Then enablep( 22) C enablep( 21). 
Proof. Let us prove that, for every argument U, we have PI p, N u whenever PI x2 N g. 
To this end, let (+ be an argument with PI, N (T. If g E C or, for some q, . . . , (T,,, 
we have ~1,. . . , IT,, + CT’, then there is nothing to prove as 21 and & are not involved 
here. If, for some ~1,. . . , u,, we have ~1,. . . , CT, + IT, then we use the simple fact 
that if something holds for every subset of 22, then it must hold for every subset of 21 
too. This suffices to establish the third case, and to conclude that Plx, N (T. Hence, the 
proposition follows. 0 
The fact that enablement reverses inclusion will be used repeatedly in the following 
section. 
4.4. Inductive warrant 
A theory of inductive warrant is based on the idea that defeaters can be defeated 
themselves, and that this hierarchy of defeat can be continued indefinitely. Thus, defeaters 
can be defeated by defeater-defeaters which, on their turn, can be defeated by defeater- 
defeater-defeaters, and so on. As opposed to enablement, which is about primary defeat, 
inductive warrant is able to deal with complex forms of defeat, such as cascaded defeat 
and reinstatement. 
The basic idea behind inductive warrant is as follows. We begin with a fixed base 
set. The idea is that all arguments that are based on that particular base set are divided 
into different levels. At level 1, every argument is simply declared to be in force. At 
level 2, some arguments are defeated by arguments at level 1, so that level 2 contains 
precisely those arguments that are not defeated by arguments at level 1. At level 3, 
some arguments at level 1 that were defeaters of arguments at level 2, are defeated 
at level 2 themselves. Therefore, some of the arguments that were defeated at level 
2 are reinstated at level 3. At level 4, some of the arguments that were reinstated at 
level 3 should be given up, as they are defeated by level-2 arguments and/or arguments 
that were reinstated at level 3. And so forth. The concept “level-n argument” is from 
[31,36]. 
If these ideas are formulated in the current vocabulary, we obtain the following 
definition. 
Definition 4.11 (Level-n arguments). Let P be a base set. An argument u is in force 
at level 1 on the basis of P if it is based on P. Let n > 1. An argument (+ is in force 
at level n on the basis of P, written P k, g, if 
(1) the set P contains U; or 
(2) forsomeargumentsq ,..., (+,wehavePk,,q ,..., g,and(+, ,..., ~,,--+~; 
or 
(3) forsomeargumentscq ,..., urn wehave P ~,,CTJ ,..., (+“, andal ,..., u,,+u 
and every set of arguments .S that is in force at level n - 1 on the basis of P is 
not a defeater of LT. 
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Fig. 5. Development of {i&(P)},. 
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The expression info,,(P) denotes the set of arguments {U 1 P b, c} (see Fig. 5). 
Inductive warrant can be expressed in terms of enablement. By means of applying the 
enablement operator n times on a base set, for some n 2 1, we obtain precisely those 
arguments that are in force at level n. 
Proposition 4.12 (Iteration of enablement). Let P be a base set. Then, for every n 2 
1, info,,(P) =enabl$(P). 
Proof. We prove this with induction on n. If n = 1, then both info1 (P) and enable;(P) 
are equal to arguments(P). Next, let us assume that the equality holds for n - 1. We 
must show that info”(P) = enablep o info,,_1 (P) holds. This can easily be verified with 
the help of Definitions 4.4 and 4.11. 0 
The previous proposition is a helpful device for computing inductive warrant.9 Let 
us apply it immediately in the following example. In this example, we have taken 
a specific argumentation system that shows off some typical properties of inductive 
warrant. 
Example 4.13. Consider the abstract argumentation system A with language C = 
{pi)%1 U {I} with rules 
and with an order on arguments < such that, for every 1 6 i 6 n - 1, we have =kpi+t 
< *pi+ Let US, for the sake of brevity, put (pi =&f api, for every 1 6 i < n. Then 
CT” < * . . < (~1, and every argument (Ti is incompatible with its immediate neighbor. Let 
P = 0. In case n = 8, 
g There is a relation with Dung’s notion of acceptability 191. An argument A is acceptable w.r.t. a set of 
arguments S if, for every argument B: if B attacks (i.e., defeats) A, then B is attacked (i.e., defeated) by 
S. (In our terminology: (+ is accepted by S if every defeater of CT is defeated by a subset of 2.) Dung’s 
characteristic function FA,z? is given by FA,v(S) =kr {A 1 A is acceptable w.r.t. S}. It can be shown that 
FAF GE enable;. In words: if enablement is squared we obtain Dung’s notion of acceptability. In more general 
terms this means that Dung’s acceptability operator can be expressed in terms of our enablement operator. 
Whether the convene holds is unknown. 
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infol(P) = (~1,~2,~3,c+4,(+5,~6.~1,~8), 
info2CP) = {al}, 
hfo3(p) ={al,^a2,a3,U4,(+5,U6,u77r(+8}, 
i&4(p) = {Ul,^a2,U3}, 
infoS(p) = {~1,~2~~3,~4q,Ug,U6,U77rUg}, 
infoS(p) ={u19~29cT3,~49(r5}9 
info7(p) ={~l,^a2,(73,~4,~5,~6,U7,(T8}, 
infoE = {(TI,~2,(T3,~4,u5,~6,u7}. 
Further, for all k 2 1, info,+k (P) = info,,(P) . lo 
This example shows off nicely some typical properties of inductive warrant. First, we 
see that, for every 1 < i < n, the argument ui is defeated and reinstated (i - 1) /2 times 
if i is odd, and defeated i/2 times and reinstated (i - 2) /2 times if i is even. So the 
arguments oi for which i is odd, emerge undefeated eventually. Further, we see that odd 
info’s are big, while even info’s are small. More precisely, we see that the odd info’s, as 
a sequence of sets of arguments, are monotonically decreasing, while the even info’s are 
monotonically increasing. Moreover, we see that every even info is contained in every 
odd info. These findings are not typical for the case at hand. They hold in general: 
Proposition 4.14. The sequence {infon (P) }z, is an alternating sequence of sets of 
arguments, such that {infozn (P) }E, is monotonically increasing, and {infoa-1 (P)}:, 
is monotonically decreasing: 
info2CP) C info4CP) C ... C info3(P) 2 infol(P). (6) 
Proof. It suffices to prove that, for every n 2 1, we have 
info2, ( P) C info2n- 1 (P) , 
info2, ( P > C infoa+;? ( P > ,
info2n+l(P> C info2n-1(P), 
info2,+2 ( P 1 C infoa+ 1( P ) . 
Let us prove this for n = 1. First, by using Proposition 4.12, we write info,(P) = 
enable”p( P). By Definition 4.4, we have P C enablep( P). Applying Proposition 
4.10 three times, we get enables(P) C enablep(P), enubl&(P) C enable;(P), 
and enable;(P) C enables(P), respectively. Again by Definition 4.4, we have that 
P C enablep (P) holds. Applying Proposition 4.10 two times to this inclusion yields 
enable>(P) C enablep( P), and enablei( P) C enabZe;( P), respectively. This estab- 
lishes the case for rt = 1. For n 3 1, the proof follows with an elementary induction 
argument. 0 
‘“Thenotationwiththehatworksasfollows:{1,~}={(1},~,bb,~={b},{1 ,..., y . . . . “}={I ,..., i-1, 
i+l,..., n},{~=0,andsoon. 
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In general, the sequence {infon(P)}gt h as no limit. This is because, generally, the 
even info’s tend to remain proper subsets of the odd info’s, even for large n. However, ev- 
ery sequence of sets of arguments does have an upper limit and a lower limit. *’ Accord- 
ingly, let us write in&(P) and info1 (P) for fim in& info,,(P) and lim sup, info,,(P), 
respectively. Then it follows from the previous proposition that infor (P) and infol (P) 
are equal to Zim,infoz,( P) and lim,infoz,,_ 1 (P), respectively. l2 If infot (P) = info1 (P), 
then lim, info,, (P) exists, and equals either the upper or the lower limit of the original 
sequence. 




Ultimately undefeated arguments. The class of ultimately undefeated arguments 
is equal to in&(P). Thus, an argument g is ultimately undefeated if and only 
if, for some n > 1, we have P bnfk CT, for every k > 1. 
Provisionally defeated arguments. (Critical arguments.) The class of provision- 
ally defeated arguments is equal to info1 (P) - irzfot (P). Here, an argument o 
is provisionally defeated if and only if, for every n 3 1, we have P bn+k CT, for 
some k 2 1, and not P bn+! CT, for some other I 2 1. A provisionally defeated 
argument is called also a critical argument. With critical arguments, it is not sure 
whether they are in force or not. I3 
Ultimately defeated arguments. The class of ultimately defeated arguments is 
equal to arguments(P) - info1 (P). An argument u is ultimately defeated if and 
only if, for some it 2 1, the entailment P kll+k cr does no longer hold, for every 
k> 1. 
The terms “ultimately (un) defeated” and “provisionally defeated” are from [ 3 1,361. 
” The upper and lower limit of a sequence of sets of arguments are defined as follows. The upper limit 
lim sup, & of (&),E, is defined as Uz, flrn Zi; the lower limit lim infn & of (&),T, is defined as 
n,T, Urn X;. In other words, the lower limit consists of all arguments hat are contained in all but a finite 
number of terms, and the upper limit consists of all arguments hat are contained in an infinite number of 
terms of this sequence. 
‘* The limit fim, & of ( &)nzt is defined only if this sequence is either monotonically increasing or 
monotonically decreasing. If (&),z, is monotonically increasing, i.e., if, for every n > 1, we have Z;, & 
2 lI+1. then lim,, .Tn is defined as UE, 2;; if (&),z, is monotonically decreasing, then lint, Z;, is defined 
as nz, Xn. If (.&),F, is neither monotonically increasing nor monotonically decreasing, then lim, Xn is 
undefined, unless lim i& CL = lim sup, &. In that case, lim, & is defined to be equal to either the upper or 
lower limit of this sequence. 
I3 Using the terminology of P&ken [ 391, these arguments are called defensible: “the main strong points of 
the present [P&ken’s] framework seem to be that (. .) the assessment of arguments i three-valued, in that 
it leaves room for arguments which are neither preferred [ultimately undefeated] nor defeated [ultimately 
defeated], but merely defensible [provisionally defeated]“. In the theory on defeasible dialectics, it is indeed 
the case that arguments hat are not ultimately defeated on the basis of P, can be defended successfully in an 
A-debate on the basis of P. More in particular, the arguments hat are ultimately undefeated can be defended 
successfully in finite depth, while arguments hat are provisionally defeated (in P&ken’s terminology: argu- 
ments that are defensible), can be defended successfully only in debates of infinite depth. (If the debate is 
carried out relative to a finite argumentation system, this means that parts of the debate are reiterated.) So 
Prakken’s notion of defensible indeed corresponds to its intuitive meaning. Still, within the current setting, 
where dialectical considerations are not at issue, the more neutral “provisionally defeated” isprobably a better 
choice. 
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Example 4.15 (Critical arguments). Consider the abstract argumentation system A 
with language L: = {p, q, r, s, t} U {I}, with rules 
R={p*q,q~r,p*s,p*t}U{q,s--+J-,r,t--+I} (7) 
and with < defined as u < r if and only if lrl+. < Igl+., where lgjJ stands for 
the number of defeasible arrows in U. Let P = {p}. In this example, we determine the 
arguments that are ultimately undefeated, provisionally defeated, and ultimately defeated 
on the basis of P. To do so, we localize the points of conflict in arguments(P). These 
are {p + q, p + s} and {p + q + r,p + t}. With the first set, none of the two 
arguments is better than the other, while, in the second set, the argument p + t has one 
less defeasible arrow, compared to p + q =+ r. Therefore, the argument p =+ t defeats 
p + q + r. With this information, it is not hard to find out which argument is in force 
on what level. If we do this for every argument, we obtain the following sequence. 
bh(P> = {p,p * 4,p =+ q * r,p * s,p * t}, 
kfo2(P) = {p,p * t}, 
i@3(P) = {P?P * q,p * s,p * t}, 
t%34(P) = {P,P * t}, 
t%os(P) = {P,P * q,p * s,p * t}, 
We see that 
i&,,(P) = {p,p * t} and M&+1(P) = {P,P * q,p * 3,~ * t}, 
for every n 3 1. 
It follows that in&(P) = {p,p + t} and infol (P) = {p,p + q, p + s, p + t}. 
Hence, with the terminology above, we conclude that arguments p and p + t are 
ultimately undefeated, that the arguments p + q and p + s are provisionally defeated, 
and that the argument p + q + r is ultimately defeated. To say p + q and p + s 
are provisionally defeated, we mark them as critical arguments, meaning that, on the 
basis of P, it cannot be determined whether p + q should be in force at the expense of 
p + s, or conversely. Critical arguments will be considered further in Section 4.5. 
Finally, there is the notion of inductive warrant for propositions: 
Definition 4.16. Let P be a base set. Let n 2 1. An element 4 is warranted at level 
n on the basis of P, written P /-J-, #J, if P /-J,, u and cone(a) = 4, for some argument 
(T. Accordingly, the set warrant,(P) is set equal to c~nc o in&(P) . 
Obviously, the above definition overloads our notion of defeasible entailment. That is, 
if P b-, 4, then either r#~ = (+ for some argument u, or 4 = conc( cr), for some (other) 
argument g. But as the first reading implies the second, the second reading prevails in 
this ambiguous case. 
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4.5. Warrant 
A proposition is warranted if it is the conclusion of an argument that is in force. 
Whether an argument is in force is determined in a recursive definition. This definition, 
therefore, is more involved than its two predecessors. (Cf. Definitions 4.4 and 4.11.) 
The definition below uses the defeasible entailment relation symbol (the crooked 
turnstile) t_. The symbol b is a relation between P and arguments based on P. If 
P b CT we say that (T is in force on the basis of P. Similarly, if 2 is a set of arguments 
such that P k v for every (T E _Z’, we write P /- 2, and we say that .Z is in force on 
the basis of P. 
The definition of t_ differs from the definition of 1~. - and the definition of k,,, in 
the following way. The enablement operator 12 N (cf. Definition 4.4) and the level- 
IZ entailment operator b,, (cf. Definition 4.11) are binary (i.e., two-place) relations 
between base sets and arguments. For example, the expression P /-,, CT is a binary 
relation k,, between the base set P and the argument (+. I4 Of course, there exist 
infinitely many such relations since, for every IZ 2 1, we have another b-,. But k, itself 
is uniquely determined. Similarly, there exist many relations between P and u of the 
type IZ -. Every _Z gives rise to a unique Ip N. The defeasible entailment relation b 
that will be defined next is also a binary relation. However, in contrast with the two 
former operators, it is not unique. 
The definition of t_ is equal to the definition of b,, (cf. Definition 4.11) , except for 
the third clause, which introduces recursion. 
Definition 4.17. Let P be a base set. A relation t_ between P and arguments based 
on P is a defeasible entailment relation if, for every argument g based on P, we have 




the set P contains a; or 
forsomeargumentsai ,..., gn wehavePbai ,..., o;,and(+i ,..., gn-+g; 
or 
for some arguments (~1,. . . , (TV we have P /- (~1,. . . , u,, and ui, . . . , u,, + u 
and every set of arguments 2 that is in force on the basis of P is not a defeater 
of u. 
Recursion appears at “every set of arguments X that is in force on the basis of P”. 
To find out whether u is in force, it may happen that the definition leads to another set 
of arguments, 2, for which we must answer a similar question. This recursive descent, 
this regression, may stop or may continue indefinitely. If it stops, then all questions 
are answered unambiguously and we are done. (This is formulated more precisely in 
Proposition 4.22.) If the regression continues indefinitely, there are two possibilities: 
The first possibility is that the impossibility to stop is caused by a circular dependency 
among defeaters. If defeaters depend on each other in this way, then the initial question 
comes back to u after a finite number of steps. The second possibility is that the initial 
I4 If we want to be very formal, the relation t-, must be written prefix instead of infix, i.e., b, (P, g), 
instead of P b,, CT. We will not do this. 
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Fig. 6. A maximally independent set of vertices in a graph. 
question invokes an infinite number of related questions that pertain to an infinite number 
of defeaters, each of which involves new arguments. In both cases, the argument (T is in 
force if and only if a collection of equivalent arguments is not in force. All three types 
of situations will be demonstrated in forthcoming examples. 
Definition 4.18. A set of arguments 2 is an extension of P, if there exists a defeasible 
entailment relation k such that 2 = {a 1 P k a}. The set {U 1 P k a} is the extension 
generated by i_ and denoted by infob (P). The number of different extensions of P is 
the degree of P, written deg( P). If deg(P) = 1, we cannot be mistaken about which 
defeasible entailment relation generates the extension, so that we write in$..( P) . 
Illustration: the concept of maximal independence 
The following problem lies at the basis of the recursive clause at Definition 4.17( 3). 
Suppose you are a jailer of n prisoners. Your task is to pick k prisoners, k 6 n, 
for a collective breath of air. The problem is that most prisoners have enemies. If
two enemies are ventilated together, they will probably start a fight with all the 
unpleasant consequences which that may have. 
Problem: select a large group of prisoners without enemies. 
If prisoners are represented by points and their hostile relationship is represented by 
edges, the problem comes down to finding a maximal set of independent points in a 
graph (see Fig. 6). 
The notion of a maximal set of independent points can be formally defined as follows. 
Let G = (YE) be a graph with vertices (points, nodes) V, and edges (lines) E. A subset 
I of V is called independent if there are no edges in E joining vertices of I in G. A 
subset of V is muximully independent all its proper supersets are not independent. 
The notion of independency can also be defined in terms of a relation: a one-place 
relation (or predicate, or labeling) i on points of G is maximally independent if, for 
every point u in G, we have i(u) if and only if 
for every neighbor w of U, not i(w). (*) 
Naturally, it turns out that a relation i is maximally independent if and only if the set of 
points labeled by i is maximally independent. This is nothing particular. The point is to 
note that a condition as simple as (*) suffices to obtain, not only a set of independent 
vertices, but also a maximal set of independent vertices. 
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The definition of k, Definition 4.17, emerges as soon as nodes represent sets of 
arguments and lines represent incompatibility. Thus, two sets of arguments are connected 
if and only if they are incompatible. Within an argument system, it is our objective to 
make as many arguments warranted, without making two incompatible sets of arguments 
warranted simultaneously. The latter is established by the third clause of Definition 4.17, 
that is basically an extended version of clause (*> above. 
The following proposition establishes a connection between enablement and warrant. 
Proposition 4.19 (Fixed point of enablement). Let P be a base set. Then 2 is an 
extension of P if and only if enablep (2) = 2. 
Proof. This proposition is an immediate consequence of Definitions 4.4 and 4.17. 0 
The next proposition establishes a connection between warrant and inductive warrant. 
Proposition 4.20 (Mean of inductive warrant). Let P be a base set, and let 2 be an 
extension of P. Then infor (P) C 2 and 2 C infol (P). 
Proof. At the end of Section 4.4 we have argued that infot (P) = km,, infen (P) and 
infol( P) = Zim, infoa-1 (P). Therefore, it suffices to prove that, for every n > 1, we 
have infozn (P) & 2 and 2 c info2R_l (P). Let us prove this for n = 1. To begin with, 
it can easily be verified that 
P G 2 2 infol(P) (8) 
since info, (P) = arguments(P). From Proposition 4.10 we know that applying the 
enablement operator to this chain of inclusions yields the reversed chain 
enablep 0 info1 (P) & enablep (2) c enablep (P). (9) 
Using Proposition 4.12 we get 
info2 (P) 2 enablep (2) G info1 (P) . (10) 
With Proposition 4.19 we know that Z is a fixed point of the enablement operator, so 
that Eq. (10) reduces to 
infoz(P) C .XcC infol(P). (11) 
This establishes the case for n = 1. Applying this procedure several times yields our 
desired result. 0 
The previous result perhaps suggests that inductive warrant is a good approximation 
of warrant. However, this need not be so. As soon as there is more than one extension, it 
follows from the previous proposition that infor (P) must be contained in every extension 
of P, and that every extension of P must be contained in infol (P). It is possible that 
these extensions have little in common. In such cases, it follows that infot (P) as well 
as infol (P) are poor approximations of single extensions. 
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Conjecture 4.21. Let P be a base set, and let {Zi 1 i E I} be the collection of all 
extensions of P. Then 
(1) n{-Zi ) i E I} = infoT(P). 
(2) infol(P) = U{Z; 1 i E I}. 
The following conjecture would be a proposition if the above conjecture were to 
hold. 
Conjecture 4.22. A base set P has a unique extension if and only if no argument is 
provisionally defeated on the basis of P. 
Proof (On the basis of Conjecture 4.21). First, suppose that no argument is provi- 
sionally defeated. It follows immediately that infot( P) = infol( P). With the help of 
Proposition 4.20 it may then be concluded that the extension of P is uniquely deter- 
mined. Conversely, suppose that P has one extension. From Conjecture 4.21 it follows 
that 
info-r(P) = n{Zi 1 i E I} = 2 = U{Zj 1 i E I} = infol(P) (12) 
so that info1 (P) - infor( P) = 8. The latter means that there are no provisionally 
defeated arguments. 0 
Finally, there is the notion of warrant. Intuitively, a proposition is warranted in a 
situation if and only if an ideal reasoner starting from that situation would be justified 
in believing that proposition, had unlimited time and memory been available. I5 
Definition 4.23. Let P be a base set. An element 4 is warranted on the basis of P, 
written P k 4, if P k u and conc(c+) = 4, for some argument U. Accordingly, the set 
warrantb( P) is set equal to cone 0 infob( P). 
In order to become acquainted with the material that has been presented thusfar, 
we will now present a number of detailed examples in which the relatively com- 
plex procedure of defeat can be seen at work. Let us start with elaborating a simple 
case. 
Example 4.24 (Simple case). Consider the abstract argumentation system A with lan- 
guage L = {p, q, r, s} U {I}, with rules 
R={p+q,p*r,r*s}U{q,r+_L} (13) 
and with an order on arguments 6 such that the argument p + q is stronger than 
the argument p + r, i.e., p + r < p + q. Let P = {p}. Our goal is to determine 
which elements are warranted on the basis of P. According to Definition 4.23, this 
I5 Our notion of defeasible entailment does not coincide with that of Simari and Loui [ 33,451. In their theory, 
we have P k C$ if and only if q5 is based on P. Thus, in contrast with our theory, their notion of defeasible 
entailment does not involve any notion of defeat and behaves monotonically. 
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amounts to finding the arguments that are in force on the basis of P. To begin with, 
Definition 4.17( 1) together with p E P immediately yields P k p. So p, considered as 
an argument, is in force. Next, let us examine whether the argument p + q is in force. 
According to Definition 4.17 we have P b p + q if (i) P b p, (ii) the rule p + q 
is in R, and (iii) every set of arguments Z that is in force (on the basis of P) is not 
a defeater of p + q. Since conditions (i) and (ii) are clearly fulfilled, condition (iii) 
remains to be examined. We begin mentioning that p + I and, hence, p =+ r + s are 
strictly weaker than p + q. As a result, the only set of arguments _Z that is in force and 
such that the argument p + q is not stronger than some member of z‘, is X = {p}. And 
this particular _Z clearly is compatible with p + q. Thus, condition (iii) is fulfilled as 
well. We may conclude that p =+ q is in force on the basis of P, i.e., P t-~ p =+- q. From 
this, it follows that the argument p + r cannot be in force, since 2 = {p + q} is a set 
of arguments that is in force, and such that p =+ r is not stronger than some member 
of 2. At the same time, the set _Z is incompatible with p + r. Therefore, the argument 
p + r + s cannot be in force as well, as it fails to fulfill condition (iii). Thus, we end 
up with precisely one extension, namely info(P) = {p,p + q}. 
The following example shows what happens if two arguments of equal force mutually 
exclude each other. 
Example 4.25 (Tie). Consider the abstract argumentation system A with language 
C = {p, q, r} U {I}, with rules 
R = {p * q,p * r; q, r -‘I} (14) 
and with a basic order on arguments. (Cf. Example 2.13.) Let P = {p}. Our goal is to 
determine which elements are warranted on the basis of P. According to Definition 4.23 
it suffices to determine which arguments are in force on the basis of P. To begin with, 
Definition 4.17( 1) together with p E P immediately yields P t_ p. So p, considered as 
an argument, is in force. Next, let us examine whether the argument p + q is in force. 
According to Definition 4.17 we have P b p + q if (i) P k p, (ii) the rule p + q 
is in R, and (iii) every set of arguments 2 that is in force (on the basis of P) is not 
a defeater of p + q. Since conditions (i) and (ii) are clearly fulfilled, condition (iii) 
remains to be examined. To begin with, (iii) can be simplified by observing that (iii) 
holds if and only if every set .X of defeasible arguments based on P that is in force, is 
compatible with p =+ q. Since p + r is the only argument which may cause (iii) not 
to hold if it is in 2, condition (iii) can be simplified further by stating that (iii) holds 
if and only if not P b p + r. Consequently, P b p + q if not P /-- p + r. Because 
the argumentation system A considered here is symmetric in the variables q and r, the 
same line of reasoning goes through for p + r. Hence, P /-p + r if not P b p =k- q. 
Combining this with the previous result yields 
P f- p + q if and only if not P /- p + r. 
As a result we have p is warranted and, moreover, q is warranted if and only if r is 
not warranted. 
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Example 4.25 shows that our notion of defeat is not skeptical: it says that one 
of the two arguments should be in force, without making further commitments. (So 
it is not credulous either.) With the above example, a skeptical adjudicator would 
simply abstain by saying that neither of the two arguments should be in force. This 
is a safe but inadequate procedure for dealing with conflicting arguments, as it pro- 
vides no information about the arguments involved. I6 In the following example, for 
instance, the conclusion s would not emerge if our procedure of defeat was skepti- 
cal . 
Example 4.26 (Floating conclusion). Consider the abstract argumentation system A 
as defined in Example 4.25, but now with rules 
R={p*q,p*r; q,r+I}U{q+s,r+s}. (15) 
Because the addition of the rules (q 4 s,r -+ s) to the set of rules of Example 4.25, 
( 14) has no influence on the criteria on which we concluded that P b p + q if and 
only if not P /- p + r, we still have either p + q or p + r in force, but not both. 
If the argument p + q is in force, Definition 4.17(2) together with P f- p + q and 
q + s E R yields P b p G+ q -+ s. Similarly, P f- p + r and r + s E R and Definition 
4.17(2) would yield P f- p + r -+ s. In any case, the element s is the conclusion of 
an argument that is in force in A. Thus, the element s is warranted. However, we are 
unable to tell by which argument s actually is supported. I7 
Example 4.27 (Explosion). Consider the abstract argumentation system A with lan- 
guage 
~={al,...,zl}U{a;! ,..., 22}u{I} (16) 
with rules 
R = {=h$ 1 4 E L - {I}} U {al,a2 4-L.. . , a, 22 -‘I} (17) 
and with a basic order on arguments. (Cf. Example 2.13.) Let P = 0. Like Example 
4.25, there is a tie for each pair of incompatible (and equivalent) arguments: 
P /- =+-al if and only if not P b +a2, 
P f- +bl if and only if not P k +b2, 
P i_ +zl if and only if not P b ~22. 
Arguments are not crosswise related. Thus, the status of +-bl does not depend on the 
status of, e.g., +c2, or *ml. It follows that every extension contains either *al or 
I6 In this context, it is interesting to note that Simari and Loui’s notion of defeat is skeptical, and would not 
make mention of all the possible conclusions. (Cf. [45, p. 1461.) 
I7 In [ 26 1 the element s is said to be a floating conclusion, which means, in our vocabulary, that s is 
warranted, not by a fixed argument that is in force, but by a collection of arguments, all with conclusion s, of 
which it is only known that at least one of them is in force. 
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+az, either +bl or +b2, and so forth. For every letter, there are two choices. Two 
choices for 26 letters yields 226 = 67,108,864 different extensions. 
Example 4.28 (Zombie path). Consider the abstract argumentation system A with 
language fZ = {p, q, r, s, t} U {I}, with rules 
R={p~q,q~r,p~s,s--)t}U{q,s~I; r,t+I} (18) 
and with an order of conclusive force < on argument such that p * s < p + q but 
p + q + r < p + s -+ t. Let P = {p}. Let us determine which elements are 
warranted on the basis of P. This amounts to determining which arguments are in force 
on the basis of P. To begin with, it follows from Definition 4.17( 1) that P k p. 
Thus, the element p, considered as an argument, is in force. Next, let us determine 
whether the argument p + q is in force. Since p + q dominates the only argument it is 
incompatible with, namely, the argument p =+ s, it may be concluded that P k p =s- q, 
at the expense of p + S. Let us now determine whether the argument p 3 q =S r is in 
force, and, since this is the heart of the example, let us do this in some detail. According 
to Definition 4.17, we have P i_ p + q + r if and only if (i) P b p + q, (ii) the 
rule q =+ r is in R, and (iii) every set of arguments 2 that is in force on the basis of P 
is not a defeater of p + q + r. Since (i) and (ii) are clearly fulfilled, condition (iii) 
remains to be examined. To begin with, we observe that (iii) can be invalidated only 
if p + s + t E 2, since p + s + t is the only argument that is incompatible with 
p + q + r. However, the argument p + q =+ r is not stronger than p =+ s + t-as 
a matter of fact, we even have p + q + r < p =+ s -+ t-so that, if p * s + t 
would be in force, the set 2 = {p + s --f t} would invalidate condition (iii). Therefore, 
let us determine whether p + s 4 t is in force. According the definition, we have 
P b p + s --+ t if and only if (i’) P k p + s, and (ii’) the rule s -+ t is in R. In 
an earlier stage of this example, we already observed that P b p + q at the expense 
of p + s. Hence, the argument p + s is not in force, and condition (i’) does not hold. 
This, in turn, implies that p + s + t cannot be in force. And because p + s --f t is 
not in force, it can be concluded that there exists no set of arguments 2 that invalidates 
condition (iii). It follows that P b p + q =+ r. 
In recent literature, the argument p + s -+ t is called a zombie path. ‘* A zombie 
path is, in our terminology, an argument that is not in force, but in some way still 
participates in the interplay of defeat among arguments. The idea, then, is that zombie 
paths would give the final blow to arguments that would otherwise only just survive the 
interaction with other arguments. The previous example, however, shows otherwise. For 
p =+ s -+ t, it shows that, once one of its subarguments is defeated (here, p + s), 
the original argument does no longer stand against the argument p + q + r-even 
though p + s + t is stronger than p + q 3 r. This is not the case only with this 
example, but goes through in general. Thus, in general, our definition of defeat does not 
I8 Cf. [ 261. A path is a linear argument (that is, a tree with one branch only). Since Makinson and Schlechta 
consider only paths, this explains why they are using the term zombie pafh instead of “zombie argument” 
(which sounds rather awkward, anyway). 
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allow for “sleeping” arguments that interfere with other arguments nonetheless. In the 
present theory, arguments that are defeated remain defeated once and for all. l9 
In the following example, it will be shown what happens if arguments are equally 
strong. 
Example 4.29 (Lottery paradox). An interesting paradox arises from the principle that 
the plausibility of two propositions necessarily implies the plausibility of their conjunc- 
tion. But suppose that there is a lottery with n tickets. Let pi denote the proposition that 
“ticket i will not win”, where 1 6 i 6 n. Further, let (hi =,+f+ pi denote the plausible 
argument supporting the proposition pi. Obviously, any real argument supporting pi has 
more structure than (+i. But for the present analysis, all we need to know is that all (Ti are 
similar and highly plausible. Thus we ought, by the principle, to believe the conjunction 
of all arguments, which is equivalent to believing that no ticket will win. Evidently, the 
latter is impossible. So the natural principle of combining plausible arguments has a 
false consequence. 
The lottery paradox, originally introduced by Kyburg in 1961, has often been studied, 
among others from the standpoint of nonmonotonic reasoning. By now, many researchers 
have presented satisfying solutions. Here is the paradox elaborated in the theory of 
abstract argumentation systems: 
Consider the abstract argumentation system A with L: = (pi, . . . , pn} U {i}, with 
R = {=w,. . . , =+p,} U {PI,. . . ,P,, -fJ-} (19) 
and with a basic order on arguments 6. Let P = 8. The arguments in A are ~1,. . *crl, 
and g1,. . . , CT,, --+l. As can easily be verified, 
P /V{~*~~..,fTi--l,~i+l~~~. ,c+,,} if and only if not P i_ t~i, 
for every 1 6 i 6 n. 
(20) 
Accordingly, there are n extensions. 
Suppose we have 10 independent arguments for a conclusion. Does that make the 
conclusion more justified than if we had just one? 2o It is natural to suppose that it does, 
but upon closer inspection, that becomes unclear. 21 
Example 4.30 (Accrual of reasons). Consider the abstract argumentation system A 
with L = {p} U (91,. . . , q,,} U {I}, with 
R={*p}U(*q 1,..- ,~q,1}U{p,ql,...,qn~i} (21) 
and with an order on arguments < such that +qi < +p, for every 1 < i < n. If 
u = +p and, for every 1 < i < n, the argument ri is defined as ri = +qi, then all 
I9 Pollock [ 33, p. 521 draws this conclusion on the basis of considerations on the accrual of reasons: “So it 
seems that if we are to reject the latter principle [the principle of accrual of reasons], then we should also 
conclude that arguments that survive rebuttal by conflicting arguments are not thereby diminished in strength.” 
*” Cf. [ 33, Section D. “The accrual of reasons”]. 
*I Pollock argues why. 
256 GA. W Vreeswijk/Artijicial Intelligence 90 (1997) 225-279 
arguments in A are (+, 71,. . . , T,, and (+, ~-1,. . . , r,, +J-. As can easily be verified, we 
end up with one extension, namely info(P) = {u}. 
What the example says is that “the accrual of many poor arguments does not make 
a good one”. We thereby range ourselves with Pollock [33], who argues in detail that 
the accrual of reasons is not a property of logical inference a prior& but an extra-logical 
principle that multiple support ends to confirm the justification of a proposition. (As 
Pollock points out, this principle is invalidated in, for example, a social community in 
which speakers tend to confirm each other’s statements.) 
Example 4.31 (Complex case). Consider the abstract argumentation system A with 
language JZ = {p, q, r, s, t} U {I}, with rules 
R = {P * 49 q * rvp * s,p * t} u {q, s -+I; r, t +I} (22) 
and with a basic order on arguments <. Let P = {p}. We are going to determine 
whether the argument p + q + r is in force. According to Definition 4.17 we have 
P k p =s q + r if (i) P t_ p + q, (ii) the rule q + r is in R, and (iii) every set 
of arguments 2 that is in force is not a defeater of p + q + r. Condition (iii) can be 
simplified by observing that (iii) holds if and only if not P k p + t, since p =+ t is 
the only (set of) argument(s) that is incompatible with p =s q + r. In a similar way 
we may find that 
(1) Pkp+q+rifPbp+qandq+r~RandnotPbp+t; 
(2) P b p =s q if P k p and p =+ q E R and not P /- p + s; 
(3) P FP; 
(4) P i_ p =s s if P k p and p + s E R and not P t_ p + q; 
(5) Pkp+tifPkpandp+t~RandnotPbp+q+r. 
Because the rules q + r, p + q, p =s s, and p =b t are all in R, clauses ( l)-( 5) 
reduce to 
(1) Pkp+q+rifPbp+qandnotPbp+t; 
(2) P b p =s q if P t_ p and not P /- p =s s; 
(3) P kP; 
(4) Pkp+sifPkpandnotPbp+q; 
(5) P~p+~ifP~pandnotP~p+q+r. 
Logically, this is equivalent to the exclusive disjunction of the following three expres- 
sions: 
(I) P/-pandP/-p+qandPf-p+q=+-r, 
(II) P f- p and P b p + q and P b p =s t, 
(III) P t- p and P k p + s and P f- p =+ t. 
Thus, (I) and not (II) and not (III); or (II) and not (I) and not (III); or (III) and 
not (II) and not (I). Which is precisely what we want. Accordingly, deg( P) = 3. 
The following example demonstrates a highly important feature of the theory. It shows, 
all other things being equal, that if the ranking in conclusive force among arguments i
refined, there becomes more clarity on exactly which arguments emerge victorious. 
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Example 4.32 (Complex case, with a refined order). Consider the abstract argumen- 
tation system A as defined in Example 4.31, but now with the order 6 defined as cr < r 
if and only if (~1~ < 1~1+., where ]uI+ stands for the number of defeasible arrows 
in cr. (Cf. Example 2.13.) With this new order < we have more variety in conclusive 
force, more defeat, and hence a decreasing number of alternatives in comparison with 
Example 4.3 1. 
The outcome is logically equivalent with the exclusive disjunction of (I) and (II): 
(I) P bp and P kp + q and P bp + t, 
(II) P k p and P k p =+ s and P k p + t. 
In comparison with Example 4.31 the argument p + q + I is now out of consideration. 
Hence, with this argumentation system, we have deg(P) = 2. 
The two examples above suggest that, if the hierarchy among arguments becomes 
more determined, the number of extensions will decrease accordingly. This is indeed a 
general phenomenon. 
Proposition 4.33. Let d1 = (.C, R, <I) and A2 = (C, R, 62) be abstract argumentation 
systems, such that <I is a refinement of &-i.e., u <I r whenever (T <2 r. Then, for 
every base set P, we have degl (P) < degz( P). 
Proof. We will show this by proving that every extension of P in Al is an extension of 
P in A2 as well. Suppose that 2 is an extension of P in Al. With Proposition 4.19 it 
follows that _X is a fixed point of the P-enablement operator in A, : enablep( 2) = 2. 22 
Further, the fact that 61 is able to compare more arguments than <2, implies that _X 
enables more arguments in .A1 than in $22: enable; ( 2) G enabler (2). This is easy to 
verify. Together with the previous fixed point equation, this gives enabZe;( 2:) 5 2. In 
order to prove the reversed inclusion _Z G enabfe;( ,I$), we note that 2 is compatible, 
since it is an extension in Al. The compatibility of 2 carries over to d2, so that, together 
with Proposition 4.9, the reversed inclusion follows. Combining the two inclusions yields 
enable; (2:) = 2, which means that _Z is an extension of P in d2. Cl 
The above proposition distinguishes defeasible argumentation from nonmonotonic 
reasoning. In nonmonotonic reasoning, there is little variety in conclusive force: there are 
proofs, and there are nonmonotonic proofs. Maybe there are a few extra principles that 
prefer some nonmonotonic proofs above other nonmonotonic proofs (like specificity), 
but usually that is it. It follows that the hierarchy < among “arguments” in nonmonotonic 
reasoning systems contains, as a rule, chains of length at most 3. (If the logic is 
extraordinarily refined and sophisticated, perhaps 4.) It follows with proposition 4.33 
that nonmonotonic logics often produce multiple extensions in the presence of conflicting 
nonmonotonic proofs. Argumentation systems work different. On the one hand, an 
argumentation system can order its arguments as crude as a nonmonotonic logic. (Cf. 
Example 2.13, basic order.) On the other hand, one might imagine an argumentation 
system in which the conclusive force of arguments is expressed by a number ranging 
** Since we are labeling the enablement operators with 1 and 2, the P has been pushed up above temporarily. 
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from 0.000 to 1 .OOO (three-place precision). In this way, it is very likely that arguments 
always differ in conclusive force, because their strength is expressed by an absolute 
number that assumes values on a finely divided graduated scale. With such a notion 
of conclusive force, the chance that an arbitrary base set gives rise to precisely one 
extension is comparatively high. 
Example: negation by failure 
Negation by failure (NBF) is the principle by which a proposition may be derived 
as soon as we fail to prove its negation. (Cf. [ 1,4,18] .) Within the present formalism, 
it is relatively simple to define an abstract argumentation system that works according 
to the negation by failure principle. 
Nonmonotonic reasoning by negation by failure is always defined relative to a fixed 
proof system. 
Definition 4.34. A proof system P is a pair (C, R) where C is a language, and R is a 
set of strict rules of inference. 
Example 4.35 (Negation by failure). Let P = (L, R) be a proof system in which 
L is closed under negation. The corresponding NBF argumentation system, then, is 
A = (C, R’, <) with 
R’=RU{~~~~EL}U{+~-~~} (23) 
and with < the standard basic order of conclusive force. Then, for every base set P, we 
have P i_ 4 if and only if P I- q5 or P k -4. 
This example nicely demonstrates the relative simplicity of NBF. Among the de- 
feasible arguments, there is no difference in conclusive force, so that all improvable 
propositions are supported by arguments of the same type. Among others, this means 
for example that if there are n irrefutable, improvable and pairwise incompatible propo- 
sitions, then applying NBF yields n different extensions. A situation in which each 
argument can only live in its “own” extension, screened from its competitors. In this 
way, the present theory of abstract argumentation systems positions NBF as a rather 
crude way to deal with plausible but improvable propositions. 
Degenerate argumentation systems 
It has already been observed that a defeasible entailment relation is sometimes am- 
biguously determined. In some situations, there is more than one valid way to define k. 
In addition it may also happen, at least in theory, that, for some argumentation system 
and for some base set, there is no defeasible entailment relation at all. I.e., there may 
exist a pair A, P for which there exists no relation k that satisfies all three conditions 
of Definition 4.17. Let us call a pair A, P for which such a negative event is the case 
degenerate. The question whether there exist degenerate argumentation systems is equiv- 
alent with the question whether there exist base sets without extensions. The answer to 
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this question is unknown to us. Although we spent considerable effort in constructing a 
degenerate argumentation system, we failed to do so. On the other hand, we were un- 
able to substantiate our findings in a theorem which states that degenerate argumentation 
systems do not exist. At this point, the existence of degenerate argumentation systems 
is an open problem. 
5. Completeness 
In this section, we consider sets of arguments in more detail. As opposed to one 
single argument, a set of arguments may satisfy additional interesting properties. Sets 
of arguments that satisfy these additional properties, may act as “information carrier” in 
the theory. (We will come back to this point in Section 5.1.) 
5. I. Argument structures 
The theory will further develop along the framework of argument structures.23 An 
argument structure is a structured set of arguments. 24 From an epistemic point of view, it 
might be conceived as a description of a part of the world. Therefore, terms like possible 
world, scenario, situation, state of affairs, or even model suit equally well. Because an 
argument structure is not closed under any sort of argumentation whatsoever, it generally 
is a partial and unjinished escription of a state of the world. 
Definition 5.1. A set of arguments 2 is an argument structure if it is compatible and 
contains all subarguments of its members. 
If a set of arguments is compatible, it is not self-contradictory. If it contains all subar- 
guments of its members, it may be considered to contain all intermediate stages of argu- 
mentation. Further, argument structures are not closed with respect to argumentation- 
not even with respect to strict argumentation. The reason for not automatically incorpo- 
rating strict continuations of arguments into our notion of argument structure is that, at 
all times, we would like to keep a full saying over the arguments that are included in 
an argument structure. 
*s Our notion of argument structure is taken from [201. In fact, their notion of argument structure coincides 
with ours upto one minor point. Lin and Shoham exchange compatibility for consistency and stipulate further 
that argument structures are closed with respect to strict argumentation. (In the reading of Lin and Shoham, 
consistency is defined as not having an argument supporting C$ and another supporting -4, for some 4. 
Instead of the contradiction, the negation is the elementary connective in their formalism.) The problem with 
strict closure, however, is that the inclusion of a single defeasible argument may incorporate a large number of 
other arguments as well. We do not want this. Instead of a theoretical closure operator, which already implies 
something about the properties on argumentation, we just want to have a simple device for holding arguments. 
24 In consequence, our notion of argument structure has nothing to do with that of [45]. Their notion of 
argument structure represents what we would call an argument. (Maybe, it is interesting to note that most of 
the technical choices in the 1992 paper were done by Simari, not by Loui. In actual fact, Loui tends to agree 
with the present definition.) 
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Example 5.2. Consider the abstract argumentation system A with language L: = 
{p, 9, r} U {I}, with rules 
R={p*q,p*r}U{q,r+-L} (24) 
and with a basic order on arguments <. Let P = {p}. Then Zt = P is an argument 
structure, like & = {p, p + q} and 23 = {p, p + r}. The set _Za = {p,p + q,p =+ r} 
is not an argument structure because it is incompatible, and & = {p + q} is not an 
argument structure because it does not contain all subarguments of its members. 
Like (partial) models in (modal) mathematical logic, argument structures are the 
information carriers of the theory. They speak for or against (individual) arguments. 
It is also possible that an argument structure says nothing about an argument. In that 
case, the argument in question is neither contained in, nor contradicted by, the argument 
structure. In other cases, the argument structure is able to distinguish the argument as 
an element that either does or does not hold. 
Definition 5.3. Let r be an argument. An argument structure _Z is able to distinguish 7 
if r E Z whenever 2 is compatible with 7. 
Thus, an argument structure that is able to distinguish r is either explicitly “for” 7, 
or else explicitly “against” 7. In the example above, Zt is able to distinguish p, while 
both 22 and 23 are able to distinguish p, p =s q, and p + r. 
Obviously, an argument structure that is able to distinguish every argument [based on 
P] , is maximally compatible [within arguments(P) 1. 
The notion of argument structure is the vehicle on which the theory is further devel- 
oped. More specifically, in the following sections it will be shown that the set of all 
arguments that are in force is an argument structure itself, and can be approximated in 
a constructive manner by a sequence of argument structures. 
5.2. Complete argument structures 
The most interesting argument structures should be those that contain not only many 
arguments, but also many strong arguments. To this end, maximally compatible argu- 
ment structures appear to be right candidates. Maximally compatible argument structures 
may be thought of as obtained by extending compatible argument structures monotoni- 
cally, until further extension is impossible. That is, without giving up arguments earlier 
included and without sacrificing compatibility. However, there is nothing that assures us 
that maximally compatible argument structures contain relatively many strong arguments. 
The notion of complete argument structure is defined in such a way, that it incorporates 
strong arguments. For complete argument structures, the only criterion for enlargement 
is preservation of compatibility. This means that arguments earlier included may be 
given up in order to give place to other (presumably stronger) arguments. This idea is 
embodied by the notion of appendability. 
The basic idea behind appendability is as follows. Given an argument structure 2, 
we consider an argument (T having its proper subarguments in ZI. If (+ is not in 2, it 
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potentially provides new and better information relative to 2. However, this need not 
be so. If g is incompatible with 1) and is too weak to undermine .Z, then u is not a 
valuable piece of new information that should be added to 2. On the other hand, if 
(+ is compatible with 2, it is new information that must be appended to _Z. Also if cr 
is incompatible with 2, it may be appended to 2, provided the argument u is strong 
enough to defeat some member of 2. If that is the case, u provides information that is 
even better than what is in -C, and u should be appended to 2 as well. 
Definition 5.4. Let _Z be an argument structure. An argument u is appendable to 2 if 
( 1) the argument cr already is in 2; or 
(2) for some arguments q, . . . , u,, we have (+I E 2,. . . , CT,, E 2 and (+I,. . . , u,, 4 
(T; or 
(3) forsomeargumentsat ,..., a,wehaveatEX ,..., g,EZandut ,..., un+ 
u, and _Z does not contain defeaters of u. 
All subsets of .Z must be examined for defeaters. To see this, suppose that u is 
incompatible with 2 but that, at the same time, u’ < u, for some u’ E 2. On the basis 
of this information, it would be wrong to say that u can be appended to 2 at the expense 
of u’, because u’ might be irrelevant to the conflict. That is, the difference 2 - {a’} 
might still be incompatible with u. For this reason, it is necessary to consider more 
subsets of 2. Large subsets of 2 are not likely to invalidate Definition 5.4(3) because 
there is a fair chance that such subsets contain an element u’ that is stronger than u. 
Similarly, small subsets of _X are not likely to invalidate Definition 5.4( 3)) because they 
are often compatible with u. Somewhere in between, however, there might be a defeater 
_ZS & 2 that invalidates the third clause. In effect, this interplay between conclusive 
force and compatibility necessarily involves all subsets of 2. (Cf. also Example 4.3.) 
This partially explains the relative complexity of Definition 5.4( 3). 
Definition 5.5. Let _Z be an argument structure. Then append( 2) denotes the collection 
of arguments that are appendable to _Z. 
Also here, the enablement operator takes part in the theory. If the enablement operator 
is indexed with argument structures, rather than with base sets alone, then append( 2) 
can be defined as enablex( 2). This notation also establishes a correspondence between 
the notion of extension and completeness. (Cf. Proposition 5.11.) 




U {r, r-1 +I; r, r2 -1; r, i-3 -il} 
(25) 
(26) 
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and with the =+count order on arguments. (Cf. Example 4.32.) Let 
~={P,p~qq,p~qq~r)U{p~ql}. (27) 
The set _Z is an argument structure. If u = p + q1 + r-1, 7 = p + r-2 and p = p + r-3, 
then r and p are appendable to _Z while (+ is not. Let us see why this is so. The argument 
p = p -+ r3 is appendable to 2 simply because p E 2 and we may unconditionally 
append strict continuations of members of 2 [cf. Definition 5.4(2)]. If we want to 
check whether r is appendable to 2, item (3) applies. If _Zs is a subset of 2 that is 
incompatible with 7, then p =+ q + r must be in 2s. Since p =+ r2 is stronger than 
p + q + r we conclude that p + r2 is stronger than some member of 2~. Hence, item 
(3) holds for p + r2, so that p + r2 is appendable to 2’. Finally, (+ is not appendable 
to X because 2~ =&f 2 is a defeater of c. 
Definition 5.7. An argument structure X is complete if every argument that is append- 
able to .Z already is in 2;. 
Because more information is not possible, a complete argument structure is saturated 
orjnished. Again, from the epistemic perspective, a complete argument structure might 
be considered a complete description of a part of the world (cf. the discussion preceding 
Definition 5.1). This idea is elaborated in the following proposition. This proposition 
states that a complete argument structure is complete in the sense that it distinguishes 
every argument that can be generated. 
Proposition 5.8. Let P be a base set. A complete argument structure 2 with prem ( 2) = 
P is able to distinguish every element in arguments(P). 
Proof. Let 2 be a complete argument structure with prem( 2) = P, and let r E 
arguments(P). We will have to prove that r E 2 whenever 2 is compatible with 
7. However, let us prove something stronger. Let us prove that every element of ev- 
ery finite sequence 9-1,. . . ,T, that is, as a whole, compatible with 2, is contained in 
_Z. This stronger statement ensures that the induction argument below will go through. 
More precisely, the last proposition will be proven with induction on the construction 
of 7],...,7,. Without loss of generality, we may prove the proposition for single ar- 
guments only (but then turning to multiple arguments in the induction step). Suppose 
_Z is compatible with 7. We distinguish three cases: (i) r E C; (ii) 71,. . . , 7, -+ T for 
some rr,..., rn; or (iii) 71,. . . , 7, + 7 for some 71,. . . ,T,,. If (i) r E L, then r E P. 
Because P = prem( 2)) we immediately conclude that r E 2. If (ii) 71,. . . , T,, + T, 
then 71, . . . , r, is, as a whole, compatible with _Z as well. Using our induction ar- 
gument, it follows that rt E 2,. . . ,T,, E 2. By definition, this means that r is ap- 
pendable to 2. Since 2 is complete, it follows that r E 2. If (iii) 71, . . . , T, + 7, 
then 71 E 2,. . . , T,, E .Z as in (ii). Since 2 is compatible with 7, it follows imme- 
diately that every subset 2~ of 2 is also compatible with 7. Hence, r is appendable 
to .Z:, so that r E 2. Since, in all three cases, it is proven that r E ZI, the proof is 
completed. 0 
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Intuitively, this proposition says that complete argument structures are either “for” or 
“against” every argument that can be generated from the base set. This was the basic idea 
of completeness in [20]. 25 Does the converse hold? That is, are argument structures 
that are able to distinguish many arguments automatically complete? The answer is “no”. 
The construction of an elementary counterexample is left to the reader. 
For a proper understanding of the theory, it is important to know that not every 
argument structure is contained in a complete argument structure. In fact, if an argument 
structure contains arguments that can be defeated by other arguments rooting in the 
same premises, these arguments must be given up first before this argument structure 
eventually might be completed. From the fact that not every argument structure is 
contained in a complete argument structure, it also follows that not every argument 
structure that is maximal with respect to set inclusion, is a complete argument structure. 
(Addition of weak arguments shows this.) Thus, maximality is not precisely the same 
as completeness. However, we do have the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.9. Within every class of argument structures that coincide on atomic 
arguments, complete argument structures are C-maximal. 
Proof. Let St and & be two argument structures with prem( 2,) = prem( _&), such 
that Zt is complete and St C &. Let us prove that 3 C 21 with induction on the 
construction of the members of 22. Let u E &. If (i) the argument (T is an atomic 
argument, then (r E prem( &), and hence (+ E prem( Sl>, since 21 and 22 are supposed 
to have equal premises. If (ii) for some arguments gt, . . . , CT~ we have ut , . . . , CT,, --+ 
CT, then all of gi,..., v,, are in 22, because & is an argument structure. Using our 
induction hypothesis, we may conclude that all of cut, . . . , u, are in 21 so that, by the 
completeness of St, we have u E Zt . If (iii) for some arguments ui , . . . , u, we have 
(TIT..., u, + u, then all of ut , . . . , un are in St, as above. Because Xt is a complete 
argument structure, it suffices to show that u is appendable to St. This readily follows 
from the fact that u E 22, ,Xt C 22, and 22 is compatible. Cl 
From this proposition it follows that complete argument structures with equal premises 
are incomparable with respect to set inclusion. It is possible for complete argument 
structures to include one another, but from Proposition 5.9 it then follows that, in such 
cases, these argument structures must have different premises. 
Complete argument structures are extensions of their premises: 
Proposition 5.10. Let P be a base set, and let 2 be a complete argument structure 
with prem( 2) = P. Then X is an extension of P. 
Proof. Let _Z be a complete argument structure with prem( 2) = P. We must prove that 
2 is an extension of P, which means that we must find a defeasible entailment relation 
25 In the literature, there is at least one alternative notion of completeness, namely that of [ 201. In Lin and 
Shoham’s theory, an argument structure T is complete ubout qS if either C#J E T or -4 E T. Our notion 
of completeness (cf. Definition 5.7) is based on ideas that are different han Lin and Shoham’s ideas on 
completeness. 
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b such that infob (P) = 2:. To this end, we define P f- CT if and only if u E .X We then 
show that this definition of k obeys the rules of Definition 4.17 as follows. First, suppose 
P b (+. By definition, this means u E 2. It follows that either (i) the argument u is in 
prem( 2); or (ii) for some arguments ~1 E 2,. . . , un E .Z we have ui, . . , , CT,, --+ u; 
or (iii) for some arguments 01 E z(, . . . , u, E .Z we have (~1,.  . , un +- u and _X 
does not contain defeaters of u. If these three cases are translated back in terms of 
entailment, we arrive at our desired result. Conversely, suppose that either (i) the set P 
contains a; or (ii) for some arguments ut, . . . , u,, we have P t-- ~1,. . . , P t- u, and 
(+I,..., un-$u;or(iii)forsomeargumentsu~,...,u~wehaveP~u~,...,P~ucr, 
and (+I,... , un + u and every set of arguments _Z that is in force on the basis of P 
is not a defeater of u. Translating all entailments in terms of membership in _Z, and 
using the completeness of 2, it follows that u E 2. By definition, this means that 
Pt--u. El 
A converse of this proposition holds as well: 
Proposition 5.11. Let P be a base set, and let 2 be an extension of P. Then 2 is a 
complete argument structure with prem( 2) = P. 
Proof. Since 2 is an extension of P, there is a relation b between P and arguments on 
P such that 2 = info+(P). Thus, for every argument u, we have u E 2 if and only if 
P /- u. Let us now prove that _Z is a complete argument structure with prem( 2) = P. 
There are three statements o be proved: (a) the set 2 is an argument structure, (b) the 
argument structure 2 is complete, and (c) we have prem( 2) = P. 
(a) To prove that 2 is an argument structure, we must prove that ( 1) the set Z 
is closed under subarguments, and that (2) the set 2 is compatible. Point (1) 
immediately follows from Definition 4.17. To prove (2), assume to the contrary 
that _Z is incompatible. By the definition of incompatibility (Definition 3.2) 
there must be a finite incompatible subset _Zs of 2. It can easily be verified that, 
without loss of generality, we may assume that all elements in & are of the form 
Ul,...r CT,, + cr. Since & is finite, it has a <-least element u (cf. proposition 
3.5). Because _ZS - {a} is a defeater of u that is in force, the argument u should 
according to Definition 4.17( 3) not be in force. But it is, as u E BS and 2~ C _Z, 
so that, after all, _Z cannot be incompatible. 
(b) To prove that 2 is complete, we must prove that every argument appendable to 
_Z already is in 2. So let u be an argument that is appendable to _Z. In proving 
that u E _Z, we follow Definition 5.4. If (i) the argument u already is in 2, 
we are done. If (ii) the argument u satisfies condition (2) or condition (3) 
of the definition of appendability, then u immediately satisfies condition (2) or 
condition (3) of Definition 4.17, since every subset .Zs of Z simply is a set 
of arguments 2 that is in force. Because, in these two cases, u either satisfies 
condition (2) or condition (3) of Definition 4.17, u is in force, i.e., u E 2. 
(c) To prove that prem( 2) = P, it suffices to refer to Definition 4.17, from which it 
follows that every argument in _Z has its premises in P. 
Conditions (a), (b), and (c) together yield that .X is an argument structure. 0 
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From Proposition 5.11 it follows that every extension of P is a complete argument 
structure; and the latter implies that the set of elements that are warranted on the basis 
of P, is compatible. Another consequence of Proposition 5.11 is that extensions are 
maximal argument structures. 
6. Construction of complete argumentation structures 
Extensions are important but problematic sets. They are defined by means of fixed 
point definitions, which are not constructive. In the first instance, this would imply that 
extensions cannot be constructed by adding arguments to an existing argument structure. 
The latter is right: it is indeed hard to formulate a constructive procedure on the basis 
of a fixed point definition. But from the previous section we know that extensions 
coincide with complete argument structures, so that we might try to find a procedure 
for constructing complete argument structures. The aim of this section is to do just that. 
6.1. Elementary argumentation steps 
An elementary argumentation step is an elementary transition from one argument 
structure to the next, involving the application of at most one rule of inference. 
An elementary argumentation step is defined with the help of the notion of direct 
construction. 
Definition 6.1. Let _Z be an argument structure. An argument is directly constructed 
from _Z if all its proper subarguments are in 2. An argument structure is directly 
constructed from 2 if all its members are directly constructed from .X 
As an example of arguments that are directly constructed from a particular argument 
structure, we might take the arguments that are appendable to that argument structure. 
(This fact readily follows from the definition of appendability.) 
Definition 6.2. An elementary argumentation step from 21 to & is a pair of argument 
structures 21, & such that & is directly constructed from _Zi and & - _YSr consists of 
precisely one element. 
Let 21, & be an elementary argumentation step. We call an argument kept if it is in 
Zt n 22, deleted if it is in Zt - 22, and new if it is in & - 21. With this terminology, 
it clearly follows that every argument in Xt is either kept or deleted, and that every 
argument in 22 is either kept or new. In contrast with arguments that are new, there is no 
upper bound on the number of arguments that may be deleted per argumentation step. 
6.2. Argumentation sequences 
Beginning with a base set, it is the intention to work from one argument structure to 
the next, always including one argument at a time. Sometimes, when weak arguments 
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are exchanged for better ones, arguments are collectively deleted. In the process of 
including and deleting arguments, the final objective is to increase the net amount of 
information eventually. 
Definition 6.3. An argumentation sequence (J$,)g, is a collection of argument struc- 
tures {&}g, such that, for every n > 1, the pair &, _&,+I is an elementary argumen- 
tation step. The sequence (&)E, begins with P if P = 21. 
Knowing that a base set contains a finite number of arguments, and using the definition 
of an elementary argumentation step, it follows with an easy induction argument that 
every term of an argumentation sequence is a finite argument structure. Because this 
fact will be used later on, it is listed as a proposition. 
Proposition 6.4. Let (z;l)g, be an argumentation sequence. Then, fur every n 2 1, 
the term Z,, is a$nite argument structure. 
Proof. Follows from Definitions 4.1, 6.2, and 6.3. 0 
In the course of argumentation, an argument may be included and deleted several 
times. Eventually, there are three possibilities. Either an argument is definitely included, 
it is definitely deleted, or it is included and deleted an indefinite number of times. 
Let us define an argument to be in the limit of an argumentation sequence if, at 
some point, it is definitely included in every subsequent term of that sequence. This 
is equivalent with saying that the argument is contained in all but a finite number of 
terms. 
Definition 6.5. Let ( 2,,)z1 be an argumentation sequence. This sequence has a limit, 
denoted by lim, &. An argument u is in lim, Z;, if it is in all but a finite number of 
terms of (&)E,. 
It is in order to mention that the limit could have been defined otherwise. For example, 
we could have defined an argument to be in the limit of an argumentation sequence if 
and only if it is contained in an infinite number of terms of the sequence. This kind 
of limit contains exactly those arguments that cannot be defeated. Our notion of limit 
additionally contains those arguments that are definitely established in the course of 
argumentation. 
The following result ensures that, even if we take limits, our theory remains within 
the framework of argument structures. 
Proposition 6.6. Let (&)E, be an argumentation sequence, beginning with a base set 
P. Then lim,, &, is an argument structure containing P. 
Proof. There are two statements to be proved: (a) the limit of the argumentation 
sequence (&)g, is closed under subarguments, and (b) the limit of (&)zi is com- 
patible. 
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(a) To prove that km,, 2,, is closed under subarguments, let (T be an arbitrary argument 
in lim, &. By definition, g is included in all but a finite number of terms of 
the sequence (_&,)~i. Since every term of (&)g, is an argument structure, it 
follows that every subargument of (+ is included in all but a finite number of 
terms of the sequence (.&,)Ei. So, by definition, every subargument of (+ is in 
lim, &. 
(b) To prove that lim, & is compatible, suppose it is not. By definition of incom- 
patibility there must be a finite, incompatible subset 2 of lim, 2”. Now it can 
easily be seen that, due to the finiteness of 2, the entire set 2 is included in all 
but a finite number of terms of (&)zi. Hence, all but a finite number of terms 
of (&)gi is incompatible, which is in contradiction with the compatibility of 
each individual term of (&n>Ei. 
From (a) and (b) we conclude that the limit of every argumentation sequence is an 
argument structure. 0 
The previous proposition ensures that the following definition makes sense. It sin- 
gles out those argumentation sequences that approximate complete argument struc- 
tures. 
Definition 6.7. An argumentation sequence is complete if its limit is complete. 
The concept of a limit is clear: it contains arguments that, in this sequence, re- 
main undefeated. However, if an argument remains undefeated in an argumentation 
sequence, it may not be concluded that it cannot be defeated whatsoever. If there 
exists a collection of strong counter-arguments but the argumentation sequence fails 
to incorporate them, the argument in question is saved from being defeated. Nev- 
ertheless, it can be proven that this undesired circumstance will not occur. Thus, if 
an argument emerges victorious in a complete argumentation sequence, we are al- 
lowed to conclude that it really cannot be defeated. This is stated in the next proposi- 
tion. 
Proposition 6.8. Let (X,,)E, be a complete argumentation sequence, beginning with a 
base set P. Then lim, & is an extension of P. 
Proof. Let lim,, & = Z, and let us begin proving that prem(2) = P. First, from 
Proposition 6.6 it follows that 2 is an argument structure containing P. Moreover, the 
argumentation sequence begins with 21 = P, and in the course of argumentation, only 
arguments outside L are produced. Hence, the set prem( 2) contains no more than what 
is in P. Now, according to Proposition 5.10, we are allowed to conclude that 2 is an 
extension of P. 0 
The remainder of this paper is concerned with the specification of an elementary 
argumentation step, in such a way that we are able to prove that it brings forward a 
complete argumentation sequence. 
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6.3. SpeciJcation of an elementary argumentation step 
The aim of this section is to formulate a specific elementary argumentation step (cf. 
Section 6.1) . 
Let ,Z be an argument structure and let u be appendable to _Z (cf. Definition 5.4). 
Of course, we are not going to combine _Z and u just anyhow. Our aim is to construct 
a successor of .Z;, denoted by Z + U, such that 
(i) the set 2 + u is an argument structure, 
(ii) the transition from 2 to _X + o is an elementary argumentation step, 
(iii) the argument structure _Z + g contains (T, 
(iv) from 2, as much as possible will be kept, 
(v) if arguments must be given up, the <-weakmost arguments will be given up 
first. 
Conditions (i)-(v) form a collection of rationality postulates. The formulation of these 
postulates is inspired by a similar approach in the theory of belief revision.26 We now 
try to construct a successor argumentation structure that meets the above five conditions. 
The contents of _Z -t u mainly depends on the compatibility of 2 and U: 
(a) If .Z is compatible with u, then _E + (T may straightforwardly be defined as 
-7 u {U}. 
(b) If _Z is incompatible with U, some elements of _X need to be given up to maintain 
compatibility. It is reasonable to drop relatively weak elements (that contribute 
to the conflict) first. 
(By the way, (a) and (b) are not in order for complete argument structures, because 
complete argument structures have no arguments that are appendable.) 
Definition 6.9 (M-successor). Let 2 be an argument structure, and let u be an argu- 
ment that is appendable to 2. Let { -Y$ 1 i E I} be the collection of subsets of 2 that 
are minimally incompatible with u, and let {ai 1 i E I} be a set of <-least elements for 
this family. (In a moment, it will be shown that these elements exist.) Then 
is an M-successor of .Z. 27 (The sup operator is defined in Definition 2.8.) Depending 
on the choice of the least elements, an argument structure may have more than one 
M-successor. By writing Z + u we mean to denote a set that obeys the equation above. 
In the previous definition it is assumed that, for every i E I, the set Xi has a least 
element. That this is indeed the case, can be seen as follows. From Proposition 3.5 it 
follows that _Zi U {a} has a least element. Moreover, this least element cannot be equal 
26 Cf. work of Grdenfors and Makinson [ I 11. 
27 Why M-successor (instead of A-successor, B-successor, C-successor)? The only reason to use “M” is 
that it is easily pronounceable in combination with the word successor. If this (pragmatic) reason remains 
unmentioned, one might suspect that the letter “M” has a deeper meaning, which is not the case. The motivation 
to use a letter at all, is that the notion “successor” alone has insufficient recognizability to profile itself as a 
special theoretical concept, with a designated function. 
GA. W VreeswijkIArtificial Intelligence 90 (1997) 225-279 269 
to (+, because CT is assumed to be appendable to 2. Thus, we conclude that the least 
element of & U {a} is also the least element of Xi. 
The following proposition states that every M-successor keeps an argument structure. 
(“Keeps” in the sense of our official terminology.) This proposition is needed in order 
to prove that every M-successor is an argument structure. 
Proposition 6.10. Let If be an argument structure. Then 
{a 1 (+ is kept in the elementary argumentation step X,2 + a} 
is an argument structure. 
(29) 
Proof. By definition, the set of arguments that is kept in moving from .E to 2 + (T, is 
equal to _Z (7 (2 + (7). We must prove that this set is an argument structure. There are 
two statements to be proved: (a) the set 2 n (2 + u) is closed under subarguments, 
and (b) the set 2 n (_Z + a) is compatible. 
(a) We must prove that, for every argument r, if r is kept in moving from Z to 
_Z + g, then every subargument of r is kept as well. As it turns out, it is easier 
to prove the converse, that is, it is easier to prove that, for every argument r, if r 
is deleted in moving from 2 to X+ CT, then every super-argument of r is deleted 
as well. This statement, however, is an immediate consequence of Definition 6.9. 
(b) We must prove that 2 f? (2 + (T) is compatible. This follows immediately from 
the fact that 2 n (2 + a) is a subset of 2, and 2 is compatible. 
We conclude that the set of arguments that is kept in moving from 2 to one of its 
M-successors, is an argument structure. 0 
Proposition 6.11. Let 2 be an argument structure. Then every M-successor of 2 is an 
argument structure. 
Proof. Let (+ be an argument that is appendable to the argument structure 2, and let 
_.$ + u be an M-successor of 2. There are two statements to be proved: (a) the set 
_X + u is closed under subarguments, and (b) the set 2 + u is compatible. 
(a) We will have to prove that 2 + (T contains all subarguments of its members. 
Suppose that r E _Z + u. Then ( 1) the argument r is in 2, or (2) the argument 
r is equal to u. If (1) we have r E 2, then apparently r is kept. Since _Z is an 
argument structure, sub(T) G 2. By Proposition 6.10 we may now conclude that 
sub(T) is kept, i.e., sub(T) C -Z + u. If (2) we have r = u, then we must prove 
that sub(u) C Z+u. By Definition 6.9 the argument u must be appendable to .Z. 
Let us follow Definition 5.4 to prove (2). If (i) the argument u already is in _Z, 
then it can easily be seen that Z+u equals 2, so that nothing has to be proved. If 
(ii)forsomeut ,..., u,wehaveul,..., u,-+uandut EZ ,..., u,,~.X,then 
it follows readily from Definition 6.9 that SU {u} is compatible so that _Z+ u is 
equal to 2 U {u}, and therefore contains all subarguments of u. If (iii) for some 
Ul...., u, we have ul,... ,u,, + u and ut E z(,.,.,u, E 2 and 2 does not 
contain defeaters of u. In this case, it suffices to prove that {ut , . . . , un} is kept 
in constructing _Z + u from 2, because sub(u) = sub( UI ) U. . . U sub( u,) U {u} 
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and CT already is in 2 + C. Suppose to the contrary that one of (+I,. . . , CT,, is 
removed, say (hi for some 1 < i < IZ. Then it follows from Proposition 6.14 that 
(+i < u.28 However, since U; & u we also have u 6 (+i so that, by transitivity of 
6, we have vi < pi, which is absurd. Because this holds for all 1 < i < n, we 
are allowed to conclude that (~1,. . . , c,,} is kept. Hence, by Proposition 6.10, 
we have sub(crr) U . . . U sub( a,) is kept, and hence sub(~) C_ ,Z + (+. Thus, in 
both cases, sub(r) C 2 + C, which was to be proved. 
(b) To show that 2 + (+ is compatible, suppose it is not. Let 2:s be a smallest 
incompatible subset of ,.$+a. Since (_E+ U) - {cr} is contained in 2, the set Z(S 
also is a smallest subset of 2 that is incompatible with g. By definition of .Z+a, 
the set 2~ is equal to Zi for some i E I in Definition 6.9 and should therefore 
contain a smallest representative gi. But the argument (Ti is by definition not in 
_Z + g, which contradicts our earlier findings that pi E & and 2~ C 2 + G. We 
must conclude that 2 + g does not contain a (smallest) incompatible subset 2~ 
and, hence, that CZ + u must be compatible. 
We have proven that 2 + CJ is closed under subarguments and is compatible. Thus, the 
set 2 + u is an argument structure. 0 
Proposition 6.12. Let 2 be an argument structure. Then moving from 2 to one of its 
M-successors is an elementary argumentation step. 
Proof. Let _Z + CJ be an M-successor of .X. It follows from Proposition 6.11 that _Z + u 
is an argument structure. Further, there are two statements to be proved: (a) the set 
.Z + CT is directly constructed from 2, and (b) the set (2 + g) - Z contains at most 
one argument. Both statements follow immediately from Definition 6.9. 0 
Proposition 6.13. Let {&}z, be a sequence of sets of arguments such that P = 21 is 
a base set and, for every n 3 1, the set &+I is an M-successor of 2% Then {&}g, is 
an argumentation sequence (&,)E, beginning with the base set P. 
Proof. This proposition is an immediate consequence of Definition 6.3 and Proposition 
6.12. 0 
Thus far, we have proven that Definition 6.9 meets the minimal requirements for 
constructing an argumentation sequence: the procedure amounts to an iteration of the 
M-successor construction. The question remains, however, if such a successor sequence 
will increase the net amount of information eventually. If the arguments that are deleted 
will outnumber the arguments that are appended, an argumentation sequence would 
be merely a complicated method of collecting and discharging information, without 
carrying us one step further. The following three propositions, however, tell progress 
from motion. They show that, although argumentation is nonmonotonic on the spot, it 
is monotonic in the long run. 
** We readily admit that the use of forward references distracts from the global outline. However, Proposition 
6.14 will be used a second time, and we think that it comes out at its best right before Proposition 6.15. The 
results are not circularly dependent. 
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The first proposition states that new and deleted arguments are always comparable, 
and that new arguments are always stronger than deleted arguments. 
Proposition 6.14. Let 2 be an argument structure. Let 2 + u be an M-successor of 2, 
and let r be an argument that is deleted by u. Then r < cr. 
Proof. If the argument r is deleted by g, then it is in 2, but not in 2 + U. So r 
must be in sup(ai 1 i E I), as defined in Definition 6.9. Suppose that r E sup(cri), 
for some i E 1. Because & is a subset of 2 that is incompatible with (T, condition 
(3) of Definition 5.4 together with the appendability of u tells us that g undermines 
Xi. Moreover, it follows from Definition 6.9 that (+i is a least element of & so that g 
must be stronger than pi, i.e., (Ti < u. Because Ui is a subargument of 7, also r < ui 
(Definition 2.12), so that by transitivity of 6 we have r < u. 0 
Endless chains of successively deleting arguments do not exist: 
Proposition 6.15. Let (&)g, be an argumentation sequence such that, for every 
n > 1, the argument structure &,+I is an M-successor of &, and let u,,, , u,, , IT,,~, . . . , 
be a sequence of arguments with, for every k > 1, I+,, E Z,,, and unt deleted 
lTi,,i,., in constructing 2 nl+, . Then this sequence is finite. 
Proof. By Proposition 6.14 it follows that, for every k 2 1, the argument u,,,, is 
stronger than una. The proposition now follows from Definition 2.12( 1). 0 
Finally, the third proposition ensures that the terms of an argumentation sequence 
grow in due course. 
Proposition 6.16. Let (&)E, be an argumentation sequence such that, for every 
n 3 1, the argument structure &+I is an M-successor of &. Then lim,, S,, is finite if 
and only if, for some n 2 1, the argument structure &, is complete. 
Proof. First, suppose that, for some n 2 1, the argument structure X,, is complete. This 
means that no argument is appendable to &, so that & has no M-successors, other than 
itself. Because every term of an argumentation sequence is a finite argument structure 
(cf. Proposition 6.4), we conclude that Z;, is finite, and hence that lim, & is finite as 
well. Conversely, suppose that lim, Z;, is finite. To obtain a contradiction, let us assume 
that every term of (.&)~, is not complete. Because lim, &, is finite we have, for some 
n 2 1, that lim, Z;, is in &+k, for every k 2 1. Because, in particular, the set _Z,, is not 
complete, there is some argument ~1 that is not in &,, but is included in &,+I. That is, 
z;I+ui = -Y&c,,]. Because UI is not in Z,,, it is not in lim, &. Hence, ut must be deleted 
by another argument u2 in a later stage. But u2 is also not a member of lim, & so that 
~2 must be deleted by yet another argument, say, us. In this way, we are constructing 
an infinite sequence {u,}g, of mutually deleting arguments, which is in contradiction 
with Proposition 6.15. Hence, there must be some n 2 1 such that & is complete. 0 
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Fig. 7. Chancteristic development of an argumentation sequence. 
An alternative formulation of the proposition is that the limit of an M-argumentation 
sequence with incomplete terms contains infinitely many arguments. 
Fig. 7 suggests how the elements of an argumention sequence grow and shrink in the 
process of argumentation. In practice, the undulation is not that even, but depends on 
the choice of the first arguments to develop. Thus, an argumentation sequence is locally 
nonmonotonically increasing, but globally monotonically increasing. 
7. Finite argumentation systems 
In this section a conclusive result will be established for finite argumentation systems. 
Definition 7.1. An argumentation system A isfinite if it enables at most a finite number 
of arguments. 
Proposition 7.2. An argumentation system A is finite if either its language fZ, or the 
corresponding set of rules R is$nite. 
Proof. In both cases, the length of the arguments is bounded by either ICI or [RI, 
respectively. From there, it is not difficult to see that the number of possible arguments 
is also finite. Cl 
Proposition 7.3. Let A be a finite argumentation system. Then every argumentation 
sequence (X,,)g, such that, for every n 2 1, the argument structure &,+1 is an M- 
successor of &, is complete. 
Proof. Because A is finite, it follows that Zim, Z,, is finite. Our desired result now 
immediately follows from Proposition 6.16. 0 
Proposition 7.4. Let A be a finite argumentation system, and let (&)g, be an argu- 
mentation sequence, starting with a base set P such that, for every n >, 1, the set &+I 
is an M-successor of &. Then lim, Z;, is an extension of P. 
Proof. This proposition is an immediate result of Propositions 6.8 and 7.3. Cl 
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The last result is not concerned with computational efficiency. In particular, it does 
not provide an upper bound on the number of elementary argumentation steps that need 
to be performed before a definite outcome is established. One might imagine that, in 
the worst case, if weak arguments are developed first, there is a considerable turnover 
in arguments, a process in which the right argument emerges only after a large number 
of argumentation steps. Still, the proposition ensures that warranted propositions emerge 
victorious in the long run. 
8. Infinite argumentation systems 
Insofar as the finite case is concerned, our theory is completed. However, the following 
example shows that, in the general case, a successor sequence might develop itself in 
the wrong direction. 
Example 8.1. Consider the abstract argumentation system A with language L: = 
{pn}Z, U (41, q2) U {I}, with rules 
R = {Pn * Pn+l}~, u {q, =+ q*} IJ {p3, q2 +I} 
and with the =&count order on arguments < (cf. Example 4.32). Note that A enables 
an infinite number of arguments. It follows that A is not a finite argumentation system. 
Let P = {p~,ql}. Now, there are p-arguments and q-arguments clashing at level 3 and 
2, respectively. Therefore, the only p-arguments that are in force are pi and pi + ~2. 
This is because q1 + q2 is stronger than pt + p2 + p3 while both arguments are 
incompatible due to the rule ~3, q2 -1. However, let (&)g, be the argumentation 
sequence with, for every it > 1, the term _Z” = {pi + . . . =+ pn}. As easily can be 
verified, for every II 2 1, the argument structure _&,+I is an M-successor of & So it 
follows from Proposition 6.13 that (Z,,)z, is an argumentation sequence. Obviously, 
the argument q1 + q2 is not in lim, &. At the same time, q1 + q2 is appendable to 
lim, .&. It follows that the sequence in question is not complete. 
Although this example was meant to show what might happen in the infinite case, it 
also offers a first insight in the (new) problem of how to construct complete argument 
structures in the presence of an infinite number of arguments. Working on a solution for 
this problem, however, falls beyond the objective of this paper. 
9. Summary 
We have developed a theory of abstract argumentation systems that is capable of 
dealing with a number of important problems of defeasible reasoning. The notion of 
defeat is the starting point of this theory, and the notion of argument structure is the 
vehicle on which the theory is further developed. 
To maintain insight in the often complex relations between competing arguments, 
the theory is developed progressively. Defeat is defined in terms of undermining (a 
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concept arising from conclusive force) and incompatibility (a concept arising from 
contradiction). With the help of the notion of defeat, three consequence operators were 
introduced, of increasing complexity. 
. IZN. Enablement is a more sophisticated form of defeat that takes into account the 
effects of defeaters on subarguments and sets of (sub-) arguments. 
l b,,. Inductive warrant involves iterated defeat, such as cascaded defeat and rein- 
statement. Later on, it was proven that inductive warrant on level n is equal to 
enablement, n times iterated. 
l k. Warrant is a relation between competing arguments. As such, it often does 
not give more information than a description of the mutual dependency between 
arguments, without pronouncing which argument actually is in force. In conse- 
quence, the relation b usually defines more than one fixed point, or, in terms of 
nonmonotonic reasoning, more than one extension. Later on, it was proven that all 
extensions reside between the upper and lower limit of the sets of odd and even 
level-n arguments, respectively. 
Thus, transparent and adequate criteria for adjudication among competing arguments 
were formulated, beginning with the relatively elementary notion of defeat. 
In the rest of the paper we were concerned with the formulation of methods that 
lead to the construction of extensions. (Extensions are defined by means of fixed point 
definitions, which are not constructive.) We have shown that, under certain conditions, 
it is possible to construct extensions with the help of an argumentation sequence. An 
argumentation sequence is an infinite series of argument structures of which any two 
succeeding elements are connected via an elementary argumentation step. In an ele- 
mentary argumentation step, at most one new argument may be added and an unlimited 
number of arguments may be deleted. Within the notion of elementary argumentation 
step there is room for different types of successors and thus for different types of ar- 
gumentation sequences. In the last section we have proven that, in finite argumentation 
systems, extensions can be constructed by means of M-successor sequences. For the 
infinite case we have not found a solution yet. 
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Appendix A. Rebutting and undercutting defeaters 
The present formalism, as we have developed it here, is ruled by a simple notion of 
defeat. This rule says that an argument (T is defeated by a group of arguments 2 if and 
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only if ZI is in force, the argument (+ is not stronger than any member of 2, and u is 
incompatible with 2. John Pollock, however, argues for (at least) two notions of defeat, 
concerned with contradiction and vitiation, respectively. If one argument contradicts the 
other then, according to Pollock, we have a case of rebutting defeat. If, on the other 
hand, one argument merely vitiates (an inference of) another argument, then we have a 
case of undercutting defeat, for it merely undercuts the other argument, without really 
contradicting its conclusion. However, in spite of all this, we think that rebutting and 
undercutting defeaters are two sides of the same coin, and that one can well speak of a 
single and uniform notion of defeat. 
Before we can define rebutting and undercutting defeaters in a formal manner, we 
will have to be able to represent rules of inference (which are meta-linguistic notions) 
in the object language. Therefore, we temporarily assume that every language of every 
abstract argumentation system is closed under negation (1)) conjunction (A), implica- 
tion (I), and defeasible implication (>). Thus, the implication symbols > and > are 
the counterparts of ---f and +, respectively. 
We are now able to define rebutting and undercutting defeaters in a formal fashion. 
Let g and r be arguments with conclusions 4 and $, respectively, such that (+ < r. Let 
4l,.~.,b + 4 be the last rule of cr. 
( 1) Rebutting defeat. If Cc, = -4, then r is said to be a rebutting defeater of (+. Thus, 
the conclusion of a rebutting defeater contradicts the conclusion of the argument 
it defeats. 
(2) Undercutting defeat. If Ic, = l( 41 A . . . A &, > 4), i.e., if q+ is the negation of 
the last rule of (+ in the object language, then r is said to be an undercutting 
defeater of cr. Thus, the conclusion of an undercutting defeater contradicts the 
last inference of the argument it defeats. 
At this point, it may be in order to recall Pollock’s original argument. 
Prima facie reasons for which the only defeaters are rebutting defeaters would 
be analogous to normal defaults in default logic. Experience in using prima facie 
reasons in epistemology indicates that there are no such prima facie reasons. Every 
prima facie reason has associated defeaters that are not rebutting defeaters, and 
these are the most important kinds of defeaters for understanding any complicated 
reasoning. Defeaters that are not rebutting defeaters attack a prima facie reason 
without attacking its conclusion. They accomplish this by instead attacking the 
connection between the premises and the conclusion. For instance, “x looks red” is 
a prima facie reason for “x is red”. But if I know not only that x looks red but also 
that x is illuminated by red lights and red lights can make things look red when 
they are not, then it is unreasonable for me to infer that x is red. Consequently, “x 
is illuminated by red lights and red lights can make things look red when they are 
not” is a defeater, but it is not a reason for thinking that x is not red, so it is not 
a rebutting defeater. Instead, it attacks the connection between “x looks red” and 
“x is red”, giving us a reason for doubting that x wouldn’t look red unless it were 
red. (See Pollock [ 331.) 
Pollock’s example can be formalized as follows. Let r stand for “x is red”, 1 for “x looks 
red”, and i for “x is illuminated by red light”. According to Pollock, the two prima facie 
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reasons become I + r and i + l( 2 > r) , where the first is stronger than the second, so 
that the second rule is an undercutting defeater of the first rule. 
We think, however, that this formalization is not entirely correct, particularly at the 
point where prima facie reasons are translated into formal expressions. At this point, 
prima facie rules are translated into defeasible rules of inference, where defeasible 
conditionals would be appropriate. For instance, the prima facie rule that things that 
look red usually are red, should not be presented as a defeasible rule of inference I+ r, 
but as a defeasible conditional I > r instead. The reason why this should be so is that 
rules of inference are meant to be general patterns of reasoning, to be used as templates 
in various inferences with matching form but different content. Conditional implications, 
on the other hand, whether they are defeasible or not, are statements in a language, that 
express-but not perform-a certain rule of thumb. Thus, conditional implications are 
elements of a language, merely denoting or referring to the application of a certain 
inference. In the running example, this inference would be Z,Z > r + r. Thus, from 
the information that “x is red” and the prima facie reason that “things that look red 
usually are red”, we defeasibly infer that “x is red”. Obviously, the general pattern here 
is 4,4 > IJ + I++, a defeasible counterpart of modus ponens. 
If the considerations above are taken seriously into account, the rules 2 =S r and i 
=+ -(I > r) should become 1 > r and i > l( I > r), respectively. Moreover, from 
Pollock’s example it follows that I > r is not only a statement hat expresses a defeasible 
implication, but also a statement that is defeasible in itself. Hence we should write 
>( I > r), stating that “normally, things that look red, usually are red”, where >4 is 
an abbreviation of true > c$. Here, the corresponding inference is >( I > r) + 1 > r 
which, on its turn, is an instantiation of the general pattern (>4) + 4. Now if 
{ >( I > r), i > -(I > r)} is background knowledge, we observe E, and we come to 
know that i, we know 
(A.1) 
so that (T = 1, (>( I > r) + 1 > r) + r is an argument based on P that argues for r, 
and 7 = (i, i > (-( 1 > r))) + T( 1 > r) is an argument based on P that argues against 
the prima facie reason I > r. Writing this a bit differently, we get (T = 1, (+I + r, where 
crI = > (I > r) + I > r. We see that r contradicts a subargument (+I of g, so that r 
disables (T if it defeats ~1. If arguments are judged on the basis of specificity, then we 
have cri < 7, because the statement that enables r (namely, i) is more specific than the 
statement that enables ~1 (namely, true). In that case, if (~1 < 7, we have G- is in force 
and c+r is not. From this it follows that the argument (T cannot be in force as well. 
To conclude our digression on rebutting and undercutting defeaters, let us consider 
these notions in the general setting of our framework, and show that they are nothing 
but special cases of one simple notion of defeat. 
(1) For rebutting defeat, the general situation is that we have two arguments (+ and 
r with conclusions 4 and -4, respectively, such that (T < 7. If 4, -4 +I 
is among our rules of inference-which is reasonable to assume-then defeat 
among (T and r can be handled adequately by Definition 4.17. It is interesting to 
note that, as soon as negation is at our disposal, there is always “binary” defeat 
among arguments. 
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(2) For undercutting defeat, the situation is somewhat more complicated. To begin 
with, suppose that the implication dt A . . . A qbn > 4 is at issue. In the general 
case, we then have an argument v for ~$1 A. . .A& > c$, arguments (~1,. . . , CT~ for 
#n, respectively, and an argument r for -( 41 A. . ./w,h,, > qS), i.e., against 
f: ;;.‘.‘;\q& > 4, If 41, . . . , c$,, --+ C#J~ A. . .Ac#+, is among our rules of inference- 
which, again, is reasonable to assume-then (+I,. . . , (T,, obviously assemble into 
an argument (+ for 41 A. . .A&. Moreover, if 4, A.. .A&, ~$1 A* . -Aq5, > q5 + c$ 
is a valid rule of inference, then (+ and v assemble into an argument u, u + C#I 
for 4. Now, if r is stronger u, then r defeats V, and hence U, v =S 4. If we 
avail ourselves of Pollock’s vocabulary, then r is an undercutting defeater of the 
argument (T, u + q5. At the same time, also this case can be handled adequately 
by Definition 4.17. 
Finally, to avoid possible misunderstandings, it must be said that we have not been 
arguing against the existence of two types of defeaters. The distinction between rebutting 
and undercutting defeaters is a real one, and does make sense (as John Pollock has shown 
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